- From a very early date (perhaps from the very beginning, in 814 B.C.), it seems the Carthaginian Senate (or Council of Elders) assumed overall responsibility for legislation and government. In the late-sixth or early-fifth century, however, two new institutions emerged: the office of the špṭm (“judges”), who were two annually-elected magistrates, as well as a popular assembly known simply as the People of Carthage. According to Aristotle’s rundown of the Carthaginian “constitution,” the Senate and špṭm could decide whether to submit proposals before the People, at which point the People could debate, amend, and ratify these proposals as they saw fit; a particular idiosyncrasy is that if the Senate and špṭm could not agree on whether to bring legislation before the People, decision-making powers automatically fell to the People anyway. (see Huxley 2003: 281-3) Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that the špṭm were popularly elected, perhaps through the People or some other process, whereas the Senate apparently replenished its ranks through co-option. While the People had no political power so long as the špṭm were in league with the Senate, any špṭ could in theory counteract the Senate by deferring to the People, presumably the same citizens who elected him into office. Hannibal, in fact, appears to have done just that during his tenure of office in 196. (Livy 33.46.6-7) As you can imagine, such a situation could result in enormous tensions between the Senate, composed mainly of wealthy citizens interested in maintaining the status quo, and the elected leaders.
- With that in mind, we can observe that Hannibal’s problems with the Senate date back to the time of his father. As Diodorus of Sicily tells us, “…after the conclusion of the Libyan War, [Hamilcar Barca] formed a political group of the lowest sort of men, and from this source, as well as from the spoils of war, amassed wealth; perceiving, moreover, that his successes were bringing him increased power, he gave himself over to demagoguery and to currying favor with the populace, and thus induced the people to put into his hands for an indefinite period the military command over all Iberia.” (25.8, transl. C. H. Oldfather;). Although the political situation in Carthage following the First Punic War and Libyan War remains rather enigmatic, Appian (Hisp 1.4) does suggest that some of the “men in power” (τοὺς πολιτευομένους) tried to piggyback on Hamilcar’s popularity, perhaps to deflect blame for their own spectacularly inept performance during the two conflicts. On the other hand, Hamilcar consistently met opposition from his rival Hanno so-called “the Great” and presumably Hanno’s allies. Factional politics were at play by the time Hannibal issued his ultimatum to Saguntum in 220/19, but Hannibal depended upon the continuing support of those who had sided with his father, namely the People and some senators. In fact, one of the more curious details to emerge from the Saguntum crisis is that the Carthaginian Senate denied responsibility for any treaties made between the Romans and Barcid generals. (Polybius 3.21) Hannibal entered the Second Punic War with only lukewarm support from the Senate, which ultimately controlled the flow of money and reinforcements to Italy but did not necessarily want to embroil itself in another length and costly conflict against Rome. Indeed, they completely abandoned their general when the Romans finally landed in Africa in 203, with the thirty-man inner council of the Senate pathetically prostrating themselves at the feet of Scipio Africanus and renouncing all ties to the Barcids.