the perspective that the rulers of the dynasty were “doing it right” until the formula was changed and bad decisions were made does not do it proper justice. The Ptolemaic dynasty was something entirely new for Egypt and the Hellenistic kingdoms in general were something that the Mediterranean had not yet seen although they built on older systems of governance. It is this continuous administrative, social and cultural development that makes pointing out just where the Ptolemids “went wrong” difficult. Tempting though it may be to imagine the Ptolemaic state as a direct extension of the king’s will, royal power was far from absolute and many of the changes that the kingdom underwent should not always be viewed as products of a state agenda but as reactionary developments that progressed in response to environmental, political and internal stimuli such as famines, unrest and changing political climate domestically and throughout the Mediterranean. Whatever theoretical powers lay with the crown, the ruling party would still have to act in accordance with the practical necessities brought on factors by outside of their control. But of course, some of them were more effective than others, sometimes by a lot, and the impact of indibidual rulers and their policies is also important to consider.

With this in mind, I generally take the stance that at no point did the early Ptolemies set anything approaching a comprehensive plan for the administration of their fledgling empire but through a series of reforms built on and adapted older methods of governance to suit the immediate needs of the state.

Arguably it is true that the reign of the first three Lagides appears to have been the most, broadly speaking, successful time for the dynasty. The wars of the Diadochi and reign of Ptolemy I saw virtually all significant growth for the Ptolemaic Kingdom with the acquisition of Coele-Syria, Cyrene and Cyprus and by the end of the 4th Century BC significant expansion has effectively stalled. However, the Ptolemaic Kingdom was still able to exert considerable influence in Asia Minor afterwards thanks to the highly profitable trade from Alexandria which was supported by an admirably efficient and fairly secure internal administration which saw surplus revenues and resources allocated to the crown and administrative elites. The conditions for this success can be attributed as much to the inherent geographic and economic advantages of Egypt over the other territories that were partitioned as to the personal cunning manoeuvrings of Ptolemy. Most significant urban growth and development in and around Alexandria had already peaked and then plateaued by the mid 2nd Century but this is a not unusual pattern of growth for comparable premodern cities, given Alexandria’s modest size compared to Rome which was albeit more densely populated, this apparent cap on population size does not necessarily point to a decentralization, just that immigration was no longer in full swing.

During the reign of Ptolemy II the dynastic cult was established and further conquests in Upper Egypt up to the Dodekaschoinos in Lower Nubia were annexed further securing their position within Egypt. The establishment of the dynastic cult allowed him to gather united support from his Egyptian and Graeci-Macedonian subjects, as well as cultivating alliances within the royal court. This cult and its associated propaganda would become one of the pillars of Ptolemaic rule but although the practice of sibling marriage was intended to limit potential claimants to the throne it did not quite work out that way, instead co-rulers (and their children) ended up competing with each other, often at the instigation of royal favourites and advisors who wanted to bring about regime changes.

Ptolemy III was similarly successful in his wars with the Seleucids although many of his alleged conquests including his conquest of Ethiopia, India and Babylon are based in propaganda more than any reality.
All of this success on expanding borders and gaining control over increasing territories in the Mediterranean looks great on paper but the Ptolemaic kingdom’s core was always Egypt and while the successes in Asia look promising on their own, they came at a steep cost which would only increase as the need arose. Exploiting the agricultural workforce in Egypt enabled them to pour a seemingly inexhaustible stream of resources into Alexandria and flex their muscle in the Mediterranean but this of course strained the tentative balance that had been struck between the native Egyptians and their Aegean conquerors to the breaking point.
By the time we reach the reign of Ptolemy V internal tensions reached a boiling point witha rebellion by the Egyptian populace concentrated in Upper Egypt that saw 3/5 of the country secede under the newly proclaimed Pharaoh Horwennefer and then his successor Ankhwennefer, effectively partitioning the heart of the Ptolemaic kingdom for 2 decades. One of the main causes cited for this rebellion is the arming of Egyptian conscripts in the Syrian Wars but this again, is something of an oversimplification as the new ability to rebel is not enough, there has to also be a sufficient desire for revolution. The pre-existing ethnic and cultural tensions as well as the resentment over foreign rule which should not be discounted as the Egyptian populace were not blind to the realisation that they had been conquered, nor did they naively trust in divine kingship to the exclusion of all other consideration. One facet of this revolt that was in all likelihood controversial fiscal policies. Corvee labour and taxation had been a fixture of dynastic Egypt but the Ptolemids took a level that was unprecedented with the exception of the fairly harsh Persian rule and that combined with the loss of support from the priesthoods and upper classes comcentrated in Upper and Middle Egypt laid the foundations for a successful revolt. A consolidation of higher political offices in the hands of Greco-Macedonian arrivals (including the exclusion of Egyptians from the army prior to Ptolemy IV) and the settlement of large numbers of immigrants from the Helladic world exacerbated resentment over a foreign dynasty seizing control of Egypt and there is no real reason to assume that these tensions did not exist in the reigns of previous Ptolemies, only that relative prosperity ensured peaceful domestic relations. Further, the rebellion in Upper Egypt was supported in large part by the Meroitic Nubian kingdom who sought to regain their lost territory in Lower Nubia by aiding an Egyptian dynasty centred in the Thebaid region to force out the Ptolemies, which was largely successful for them as these regions seem to have been reoccupied by them following the insurrection. Polybius is probably correct in surmising that this rebellion and the unrest surrounding it was one of the main factors in Ptolemy V’s abandonment of the Syrian campaign he could no longer sustain and the effectively permanent loss of the Ptolemaic kingdoms holdings in Syria. This revolt did much more than weaken the Ptolemids ability to carry on the war in Asia however, it made a lasting impression on society by both inflaming cultural and ethnic tensions, secessionist sentiments and shaking royal authority.
One thing that is of particular interest to me as indicative of the changing power dynamics of the 2nd and 1st centuries is the increasing importance of the priesthoods and local elites in supporting the monarch politically and ideologically. From the reign of Ptolemy IV and Ptolemy V in particular, the priesthoods take on a role of increasing importance, both in a practical sense as their power over temple lands, rights to grain levies, tax exemptions and ability to grant asylum was reaffirmed by royal edicts, but on an equally important ideological level as they supported and legitimised the king’s own right to rule. This relationship of being the priesthoods more directly being granted legitimacy by the king and being seen as more directly granting his legitimacy in turn was an important development as it not only stabilised the internal situation by strengthening the ready made local administration but it also helped to establish the Ptolemaic dynasty within an Egyptian framework in a more complete manner than had been accomplished before. The reason why I am including this rather positive development is because of what it tells us about the power dynamics in Egypt both before and after the revolt. Being centred around the Thebaid (which is the usual suspect for Egyptian revolts) most of the coordination of its support was through the local priesthoods and to understand why this was necessary it is worth pointing out that these hereditary priesthoods made up an administrative local elite that might otherwise be filled by comparable aristocracies in other societies. Temples owned and operated vast agricultural estates which were the largest land demographic outside of crown lands and with this came the responsibility to organise the plantings and harvests, assist in the protection of property and the law, the repair and maintenance of the canals and irrigation systems as well as administer local water distribution, and provide scribal and legal services to the area. All of this made them an important player in the political field as well as a fixture in the daily lives of most people, the larger temples having greater jurisdiction than village or municipal government but less than the strategoi who governed nomes and answered directly to the crown. Following the revolt it is clear that the Ptolemids saw the value of their support, in part due to some of the Thebaid temples support of the rebels and the counterbalance of the temples which either did not or were quick to aid the crown in reestablishing order in these provinces.
we can dispense with the often cited causes of moral corruption and decadence as pivotal causes. Generally speaking, these sentiments are usually echoed by Roman authors and while I would not go so far as to cite the “victors write history” trope, the attitudes and expectations of both the writer and their intended audience should be taken into account. On the whole, the individual weaknesses of the later Lagides did play a role in their downfall but dramatic accounts of personal tyranny and feebleness has come to overshadow the deeper flaws that ran within the kingdom as a whole, so without getting into superfluous detail the overall perception of a dynasty becoming corrupted by Oriental decadence and complacency should be taken with a healthy grain of salt. Plus, you know I just do not like reducing complicated political developments to personal or moral considerations if there are other more conservative options that can be considered.

That said, the relative complacency of Ptolemy IV and the corruption of court officials lead to the worsening situation in Egypt as well as encouraging Antiochus III’s aggression. Ptolemy IV’s untimely demise following the victory at Raphia and the succession of Ptolemy V who was still a boy in all likelihood instigated the rebellion which was responsible in large part to the utter defeat at the Battle of Panion. With the death of Cleopatra I we see the crown once again fall to an inexperienced successor and power enter the hands of corrupt advisors. Most conspicuous out of many ill-conceived strategies was the placement of Ptolemy VI’s younger brother Ptolemy VIII as his co-regent with the general idea being that it would prevent fratricidal conflict between the two if they shared power, as well as the decision to attempt renewed war with the Seleucids with the aim at reconquering Coele-Syria. At the time that Ptolemy VI declared war on Antiochus IV and attempted to invade Coele-Syria it, well, it probably still looked like a bad move but the ambitious courtiers were hoping to reconquer Coele-Syria and in doing so both increase the king’s power and popularity as well as their own. As it turns out deliberately provoking an already warlike ruler that is your most powerful rival while still trying to get back on your feet after part of the country seceded and went to war with you for a few years ended poorly with Antiochus IV invading Egypt itself and allegedly being crowned Pharaoh in Egypt while Ptolemy VI was forced to retreat and basically hide within Alexandria. And this is where things get interesting and a new dynamic manifests itself, you see the Hellenistic kingdoms did not exist in a vacuum and while the Ptolemids were busy fighting for their survival and the Seleucids sought to establish a new dominance, the Roman Republic took notice of the threat to its own position in the Mediterranean.
What stands out in the popular imagination as a critical turning point (and rightfully so) is the change in status to become a client-kingdom to the Roman Republic, but this did not happen all at once and the degree of Roman interference in Egyptian politics is far from consistent. We could point to the intervention of Gaius Popilius Laenas which did save Egypt from annexation but also established Rome’s dominance in relation to the Seleucids and Ptolemids and it is after this point that we see Ptolemaic rulers reach out to the Roman Senate for help settling internal disputes, as well as prospective rulers taking their claims and pleas to the Senate. Indeed, similar dynamics arose with many other kingdoms and clients of the Republic from the 2nd Century BCE onwards. Ptolemy VI against all odds found fortune in his later campaigns in Asia first supporting the Seleucid usurper Alexander Balas and then his rival Demetrios I, and was offered the kingdom by people wearied of Seleucid rule. His refusal and support of Demetrios II as successor was almost certainly out of fear of Roman retaliation, echoing the now-deceased Antiochus IV’s abandonment of Egypt. Ptolemy IX would similarly act with a greater level of autonomy in regards to Rome than some of his predecessors and certainly his eventual successor Ptolemy XII.
he civil wars which ensued in the joint reign of Ptolemy VI, Cleopatra II and Ptolemy VIII were disastrous on nearly every level. Although Ptolemy VIII was initially successful in ousting his brother from power and ruling in Alexandria he was unable to achieve a level of popularity or stability and the Roman Senate would intervene to partition the Ptolemaic kingdom between Ptolemy VIII, Cleopatra II and Ptolemy VI (who had fled to Rome following his usurpation). In Alexandria riots and civil discontent never reached a level that truly disrupted commerce but the chora and Middle/Upper Egypt were plunged into a certain anarchy. Numerous declarations and edicts stating the temples’ right to give asylum indicate that this was being ignored during the conflict, and there is similar evidence that law and order began to break down as resources and manpower was drawn away from civic services and increasing scarcity and cost of living ensued due to fragile grain supplies which had been strained by warfare, famine and bureaucratic corruption when it came to distribution along with a more general economic breakdown. Perhaps the only good thing to have come out of this division of power was a temporary return of stability and prosperity as the three co-regents were able to set about the task of repairing these damages. In the final analysis, no matter who won out, the end of conflict was the greatest benefit.
Following his older brother’s demise while returning from Syria, Ptolemy VIII wasted no time in travelling from his kingdom of Cyrene to assume the rule of Egypt and Cyprus as well, marrying Cleopatra II and murdering her son with Ptolemy VI. However, civil war would again break out as a result of his harsh and tyrannical rule and his repudiation of Cleopatra II in favour of her daughter. Conflicts which proved fruitless as the three eventually were forced to return to their previous triple regency. Ptolemy VIII despite being generally viewed as an antagonistic or, at the very least, disruptive, force in the conflict, actually made fairly successful attempts at righting the damage from economic turmoil and rampant corruption by forgiving taxes and all felonies committed during the period, excepting the unforgivable charges of homicide and treason, as well as reaffirming the rights and privileges of the temples.

Yet again, the theme of dynastic struggles will rear its ugly but familiar head, as Ptolemy Lathyros IX and Ptolemy X Alexander fight consecutive wars with each, each ruling in turn for intermittent periods with similarly devastating effects on the economy and social structure, but as always Upper Egypt was disproportionately affected, partly because of its geography and status as a disenfranchised and undervalued region of the country, and because of the latent hostility towards the ruling dynasty and rogue social elements which had outlived the revolution itself. Before his demise Ptolemy X supposedly left a will bequeathing Egypt to Rome and the province of Cyrene was annexed on these grounds, as other kingdoms had done in the past but Ptolemy Lathyros was able to hold onto it as Rome was still struggling with the effects of the Social War and war with Pontus. This will justified Sulla’s placing of Ptolemy X’s bastard Ptolemy XI on the throne, who proved unpopular enough to be lynched by the Alexandrians within a few days which meant that Ptolemy XII assumed the throne.

In truth, Ptolemy XII may not deserve his reputation of having a large share in the debasement of the Ptolemaic kingdom when viewed in the context of past events but it is true that the immense debt he incurred by bribing prominent Romans, his reliance on Rome’s.military support of his own rule, the loss of Cyprus, which was ruled by his brother, to Rome saw the loss of all the Ptolemaic kingdoms possessions outside of Egypt and its subjugation to Roman whims on an unprecedented level. Most of these developments can be traced back to the reigns of Ptolemy V and VI but were in no way guaranteed, so while we could consider this the most easily identifiable turning point it is never over until the fat lady sings.
On an internal level, the successes and failures of the Ptolemaic state are harder to separate. The effective consolidation of wealth and resources to the crown and administrative elite both bolstered the imperial strength of the dynasty and was a driving factor behind its ability to exert influence over more distant territory Asia Minor and to a lesser extent the Aegean as well as contributing to the heightened tensions and instability within their administrative nucleus of Egypt as resentment over taxation, grain distribution and inequities divided the population. With the establishment of a predominantly Hellenic military class they ensured a loyal military caste but inability of the relatively small Greco-Macedonian population (although generously supplemented by foreign mercenaries) to provide the numbers needed to sustain war with the Seleucids made the conscription of Egyptians necessary and the revolt which ensued helped to usher in an increased level of integration within Ptolemaic society. The loss of Coele-Syria was a blow to the Ptolemaic kingdom as it effectively pushed them out of Asia which was not only a strategic asset but a crucial source of materials like iron but as an Egyptian state they were still able to fairly self sustained and defensible and their rulers now began to turn their attention inwards. Any success in the Mediterranean might benefit Egypt in the long run but its immediate negative effects would be felt more palpably and any weakness within Egypt would cripple any international efforts before they even began, but although the Ptolemaic dynasty’s success within and without was inextricably linked attaining either sometimes came at the cost of one or the other as seen in the reigns of Ptolemy V and Ptolemy XII.

As the balance of power on an international level began to shift and Seleucid power increased steadily, tensions within Egypt peaked and the situation was worsened by dynastic quarrels, and although the rise of Rome checked the Seleucid superpower before it swallowed up Egypt it also put a cap on Ptolemaic power. Combating these issues became a matter of catering more and more to the elites within Egypt as well as Roman benefactors to maintain needed support. In short, the Ptolemaic Kingdom became increasingly unwieldy in the hands of increasingly incapable rulers, even as Egypt itself was trying to undergo difficult and sweeping social metamorphoses and their rivals in the Mediterranean became increasingly predatory.
Sources:
Egypt in the Age of Cleopatra by Michel Chauveau

Alexandria: Between Egypt and Greece by William V. Harris and Giovanni Ruffini

The Last Pharaohs by J. G. Manning