Our extant sources say very little about relations between the Carthaginians and the Ptolemies. The only direct evidence comes from Appian of Alexandria (second century A.D.), a rather late source unfortunately, who states that the Carthaginians requested a 2000-talent loan from Ptolemy II during the First Punic War. Ptolemy, “friends with both the Romans and Carthaginians,” politely declined. Appian further suggests (but does not elaborate) that Ptolemy tried to arbitrate a peace between the two warring states. (Sic. 1.1). There are several factors to consider, however. First, Roman activities in the Western Mediterranean may not have provoked much attention from the Hellenistic states along the Eastern Mediterranean, partly due to distance and partly to the incessant warfare amongst the Greeks themselves; and as Arthur Eckstein has explored in Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2006), Roman “aggression” might not have seemed particularly exceptional in such a setting. The historian Polybius, presents his work as an explanation for the “rise of Rome” to a confused Greek audience.

• Secondly, the Carthaginian “empire” was was quite unlike that of the Hellenistic kingdoms or the Romans in later times. Indeed, much of what we imagine as the Carthaginian “empire” actually lay in the hands of allied kingdoms (the Numidians) or largely-autonomous cities (the former Phoenician colonies along the coasts, most of which surrendered to the Romans without opposition before the fall of Carthage). So while these two powers in Africa may have nominally shared a border, the Carthaginian leadership naturally centered most of its attention on Carthage itself, oftentimes even leaving diplomacy in the hands of her generals. Finally, the Carthaginians certainly possessed the means to engage in diplomacy with other states. For instance, scholars have reconstructed a honorary decree to the generals Hannibal (= Adnibaal; no relation to Hannibal Barca) and Himilco, who concluded an alliance with the Athenians in the late-fifth (or early-fourth?) century. The best example, however, is alliance between Hannibal Barca and Philip V of Macedon as well as the accompanying treaty. As Elias Bickerman demonstrated many decades ago, the Greek text of the treaty as preserved by Polybius (7.9) is in fact an awkward translation of an original Punic document; a member of Hannibal’s staff (or perhaps even Hannibal himself, since he knew Greek) evidently carried out the task, making use of “good bureaucratic style” common to the Hellenistic period, in Bickerman’s words. (1944: 91ff.)
  See also:
  Barré, Michael L. The God-list in the Treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon: A Study in Light of the Ancient Near Eastern Treaty Tradition. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1983.
• Bickerman, Elias J. “An Oath of Hannibal.” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 75 (1944): 87-102.
• Bickerman, Elias J. “Hannibal’s Covenant.” American Journal of Philology 73 (1952): 1-23.
• Eckstein, Arthur M. Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2006.
• Meritt, Benjamin D. “Athens and Carthage.” In Athenian studies presented to William Scott Ferguson, 247-253. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940.
• Whittaker, C. R. “Carthaginian imperialism.” In Imperialism in the Ancient World, edited by P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, 59-90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.