Beginning with the events of 1964. The government at the helm is led by İsmet İnönü, the second-in-command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the Turkish War of Independence (1919-23). The umpteenth government of İnönü, that is. The experienced politician is the leader of a coalition government (to be toppled by Süleyman Demirel’s Justice Party a year later) following the coup d’etat of 1960. The post-coup governments’ task was conducting necessary social, economic, and legal reforms to re-create Turkish democracy, but developments in Cyprus occupy the centre of foreign policy and therefore of public opinion. Following the news of Turkish civilians murdered by armed Cypriot Greek groups such as EOKA/B, in Cyprus and in Turkey there is a demand that Turkey intervenes. İnönü starts to make the Americans think that the Turks are indeed considering to intervene. The President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson sends a letter to İnönü in June 1964 about the issue of Cyprus. The letter’s content is quite shocking for Turks: not only the US does not intend to support Turkey but makes it unequivocally clear that any Turkish invasion would face American hindrance. The tone of the letter was also perceived to be quite harsh. The letter made the headlines of major newspapers in Turkey. Soon after, İnönü announced that ‘a new world would be formed and Turkey would take its place in it accordingly’; that is, Turkey would readjust its position in the global Cold War according to the Soviet and American responses to Turkish interests in Cyprus. Incidentally, the letter serves as an awakening call to many previously pro-Western Turks and becomes the main milestone in the history of anti-Westernism and left-wing activism in Turkey. That is, from the early 1960s onwards, left-wing intellectuals, such as the Yön circle propagated that the NATO had no plans whatsoever of serving Turkish interests or indeed even defending the country against a potential Soviet attack. They were not alone in thinking that the Johnson letter was nothing but a blatant confirmation of this fact.
The journalist Metin Toker (son-in-law of İnönü) suggests that İnönü not only knew that the Americans would reply negatively but even counted on them for doing so; not an implausible story at all knowing İnönü’s love of manoeuvring. Toker says even İnönü was surprised by the harshness of the American reply. But, he continues, İnönü had certain encounters with the Turkish generals and from these, it emerged that Turkey was not ready to conduct a gigantic amphibious operation by itself. Hence, if Turkey seemed to be trying to intervene but actually stop from doing so without having the army and navy ready, that would be advantageous for them. Johnson did not intend to buy time for Turks, certainly, but the effect his letter had was this. This is true whether İnönü really hoped Johnson to reject a potential Turkish operation or not.
From 1964 to 1974, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) had plenty of time to collect intelligence, plan potential operations, and gather the necessary sources. Now, conducting an amphibious operation is very difficult. You must choose where you will land very carefully. You must be strong in the air and on the sea to prevent the enemy from successfully defending against a quick landing. You must keep your lines of logistics intact to prevent your troops on the island from starving or being left with no ammunition. Preferably, you must have loyal forces on the island on whose knowledge you would count to some extent. Diplomatically, Turks counted on Americans not taking the extra step of actively stopping the operation. Now, the British were the guarantor of Cypriot independence together with Greece and Turkey. Diplomacy with Greece proved futile. Same with the British: the Brits did not intend to help Turkey either. Prior to the independence of Cyprus, they insisted they kept the situation under control, now they insisted an internal solution would be more desirable and a Turkish invasion would complicate matters further. They were more threatening than the Americans but considering the situation of Britain at the time and the implausibility of an independent British operation against Turkey for Cyprus during the Cold War… The British did not want the Turks to get involved but did not intend to really put a hard stop to a possible Turkish invasion. It is dubitable that they could do this by themselves anyway: what would the British voter think of such a war for, of all places, Cyprus? It would also be difficult and expensive to sustain forces in Cyprus against an active Turkish intervention: clearly, a much stronger force would be needed on the island for this purpose. In this context, Turks turned to Americans again in 1974. By that time, the government of Turkey could not be any more different than that of 1964. The Prime Minister is now Bülent Ecevit, a poet who speaks English with a slight British accent that he bequeathed from his London years. He is the new leader of the Republican People’s Party having just beaten İnönü in the leadership contest and having won the elections of 1973 with unashamedly leftist slogans (a trait that would prove extremely difficult later on in Turkey). His coalition partner is Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist National Salvation Party. Problems existed between Erbakan and Ecevit, and between the RPP and the NSP. Two points of convergence are relevant though: a suspicion towards the West and an absolute will to make things right in Cyprus. Ecevit legalised the cultivation of poppy in Turkey in July 1974, which was banned before under American pressure (because the Turkish poppy was supposed to have a part in American heroin). Public liked the uncompromising stance of this young man and only hoped that the same stance would be visible in Cyprus. Despite some discouragement from Americans, the Turks went ahead, gambling that the US would not thwart an ongoing Turkish operation to curry favour with the Greeks. They turned out to be right.
The Americans certainly did not want the Turkish invasion and they sincerely did what they could do to stop it until it all started. Then, especially as a result of the reasoning of Henry Kissinger, it seems, they did not oppose the TAF militarily. Hence the diplomatic success. That said, the Americans imposed an arms embargo on Turkey following all this, which lasted a few years. As a twist of fate, in 1975, Demirel, who had replaced İnönü some months after the Johnson letter, now replaced Ecevit as the PM. The man seems to have had a logical operator written all over his career: if (Turkish PM is in trouble with the Americans) then (cometh Demirel). Some people took this very seriously and actually claimed that Demirel was Americans’ man, which was a politically motivated alteration of the fact that Demirel wished Turkey to remain firmly in the Western alliance and NATO. Yet, the insistence on Cyprus was such that Demirel felt obliged to close a number of American military bases in Turkey as a response to the embargo. Imagine the public outrage against the US in Turkey.
These are the three factors that have played a role in bringing success to the Turkish operation: the undivided public opinion and pressure, the military planning and competence, and the diplomatic manoeuvering. Beyond this, the Turkish government also portrayed the operation as a clash of democratic forces (Turkish coalition government, Turkish Cypriots) versus regressive and anti-democratic forces (the military junta in Greece, the coup in Cyprus). I believe this must have played a part in not provoking the world opinion against Turkey as harshly. I should also note that the Greeks made their situation even more untenable by leaving NATO’s military command in 1974 in protest. This is a totally understandable reaction given the public opinion in Greece at the time: they too felt wronged by Uncle Sam. Yet, it was the cherry on top for Turkey. With one move, they saved Turkish Cypriots, established Turkish interests on the island and its vicinity strongly, and even managed to cause Greece’s relations with the West to deteriorate.
Sources:
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy. 1950-1975, (London: 1977).
Hikmet Özdemir, ‘Siyasal Tarih: 1960-1980’ in Türkiye Tarihi IV: 1908-1980, ed. by Sina Akşin (İstanbul: 2000), pp. 191-261.
12 Mart: İhtilalin Pençesinde Demokrasi, a Turkish documentary by Mehmet Ali Birand which includes said remarks by Toker.
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