Article

1. Intro
2. It is a commonplace of modern biblical scholarship that Israelite religion prior to the Babylonian exile was basically polytheistic (For the view that pre-exilic Israelite religion was not monotheistic, see, for example, Bade, “Monoyhwhwismus”; Fohrer, History, 172; Morton Smith, Palestinian, 42; Morton Smith, “Common Theology,” 147; Zevit, Religions, esp. 648–52, 668–78, 690; Gerstenberger, Theologies, e.g., 215–18, 274–5, 279; Dever, Did God, 294–7). Many scholars argue that ancient Israelites worshipped a plethora of gods and goddesses, including Yhwh as well as Baal, El (if or when he was differentiated from Yhwh), Ashtoret, and perhaps Asherah. Preexilic texts from the Hebrew Bible, according to these scholars, are not genuinely monotheistic; the first monotheistic text in the Hebrew Bible is the block of material beginning in Isaiah 40, which was composed during the Babylonian exile ( See, e.g., Stolz, “Monotheismus,” 178–82, and Vorlander, “Monotheismus,” ¨ 84–113, esp. 93 (Vorlander claims that both the event of the exile and the alleged exposure to Zoroastri- ¨ anism engendered Israelite monotheism; on the latter, see especially 103–6). A variation on this idea is found in Braulik, “Das Deuteronomium und die Geburt,” esp. 131–49, who argues that true monotheism first emerges in exilic passages in the Book of Deuteronomy). Some scholars recognize the existence of a small minority of monotheists or protomonotheists late in the preexilic period, but stress that the vast majority of ancient Israelites were polytheists before the exile ( Mark Smith, Early, 152; Mark Smith, Origins, 149–94; Dever, Did God, 287).

1. Another group of scholars, however, argue that the exclusive worship of Yhwh as the only true deity was widespread in ancient Israel well before the exile, perhaps even well before the rise of the monarchy: ( E.g., Albright, From Stone Age, 157–72, esp. 171–2; Barr, “Problem”; Eichrodt, Theology, 1:221, 224–5; von Rad, Old Testament Theology,1.203–11(who recognizes that monotheism developed slowly out of monolatry in the preexilic period and that we cannot pinpoint any one moment at which monolatry gave way to monotheism); Halpern, “Brisker”; Petersen, “Israel”; Frymer-Kensky, In the Wake, 83–107; Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, 277– 81, 323–49, 354–67 (concerning which see further the references in n.21 in this chapter); Schenker, “Monotheisme,” ´ 447–8). Miller, “Absence,” 202–3, who argues that Yhwh had absorbed the powers of all other deities at an early point in Israelite history, even though worship of deities other than Yhwh persisted. Lohfink, “Zur Geschichte,” 22–5, acknowledges that “theoretical monotheism” or strict monotheism appears only in the exilic era, but argues that an exclusive focus on one God, under whom all other heavenly beings are anonymously subservient, appears already in the period of the monarchy and perhaps before. As we see later, this latter sort of belief can sensibly be termed monotheism, and in fact there is little evidence that what Lohfink calls “theoretical monotheism” existed even in the exile or in most forms of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to this day. Of particular interest is Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:221–685, esp. 255–85, which receives particular attention in what follows (on critics of Kaufmann, see especially nn.90, 106, and 125 later).
2. It is worth comparing Kaufmann’s massive and original treatment of this issue with Albertz, History, esp. 1:62–4, 150. Like Kaufmann, Albertz emphasizes that the exclusivity of the relationship with Yhwh stems from the earliest periods of Israel’s existence, before it settled in Canaan, and that widespread polytheism was a development of the later monarchic period, especially prominent in royal and upper-class circles. It is fascinating to note the similarity of Albertz’s understanding of this issue to Kaufmann’s (whose work, stunningly, Albertz never cites). Both see an ancient norm of worshipping Yhwh exclusively, which deteriorated especially among the upper classes in monarchic times. The two share another characteristic: Both these historians of Israelite religion engage in projects that, in their grand scope and their intense focus on a particular issue, are very close to biblical theology. (On Albertz’s connection to biblical theology, see his own comments in 1:12, 17; Albertz, “Religionsgeschichte Israels statt Theologie”; and Barton, “Alttestamentliche Theologie.”
3. On Kaufmann’s role as a biblical theologian, see Sommer, “Dialogical,” §1a, and Schweid, “Biblical Critic.”) Nevertheless, differences are also evident, especially because Albertz recognizes complexities and ambiguities that Kaufmann does not address. Albertz notes that the identity of Yhwh with the god worshipped in family piety was not always a given; the deity of family piety was not necessarily distinguished from Yhwh, but the average Israelite did not necessarily pause to identify the family deity with Yhwh either (see Albertz, 1:95–9, 187). Albertz’s work provides an outline of a more nuanced version of Kaufmann’s thesis regarding monotheism. For this reason, it is deeply unfortunate that Albertz never addresses the work of the most important historian of Israelite religion in the twentieth century. Another scholar who seems to have arrived independently at a definition of monotheism essentially identical to Kaufmann’s is Schenker, “Monotheisme”; like Albertz, however, ´ he never mentions Kaufmann.
4. On the question of El’s differentiation from Yhwh, see especially Mark Smith, Origins, 48–9, 140–3, 155–7. See also Albertz, History, 1:76–9 (and cf. 1:97), who argues that El and Yhwh were the gods of two separate groups of what came to be known as Israelites at the very beginning of the Iron Age; as these two groups merged as early as the twelfth century, so did their gods. For the opposite argument (to wit, that Yhwh was originally an epithet of El and that the deity known by this epithet emerged as distinct in Israel), see Cross, Canaanite Myth, 65–75.
5. Defining Monotheism
6. A narrow, common-sense definition of monotheism is the belief that one God exists and that no deities exist other than this one God. If we adopt this definition, we must conclude that the Hebrew Bible is not a monotheistic work, because it acknowledges the existence of many heavenly creatures in addition to Yhwh. Biblical texts refer to these creatures variously as “angels” (!ykalm – a few randomly chosen examples of the term include Numbers 20.16, 2 Samuel 24.16, 1 Kings 13.18, Zechariah 1.11–12, Psalm 78.49, Job 33.23), “gods” (!yhla – e.g., Psalm 82.6, 86.8; !yhla ynb / !yla ynb – Genesis 6.2; Psalm 29.1, 89.7; Job 1.6), and (collectively) “the council of holy ones” (!yvwdq dws / !ycwdq lhq – Psalm 89.6,8). Several biblical texts portray Yhwh as surrounded by heavenly beings who attend Him or await His orders (e.g., 1 Kings 22.19–22, Isaiah 6, Ezekiel 1, Zechariah 3, Job 1.6; a similar picture is assumed in Psalm 29 and Isaiah 40.1–2). The term !yhla ynb / !yla ynb can mean “sons of God,” “sons of the gods,” “sons of [the high god] El,” or “members of the class generally known as gods.”(edited)
7. We may ask, however, how useful this narrow definition really is. After all, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all exhibit a belief in angels, beings who reside in heaven and who do not normally die. In the case of Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, we can also note a belief in saints residing in heaven, (i.e., humans who died without any long-term effect on their continued existence and activity); similar beliefs are attested, albeit in a less formalized way in Judaism and Islam (especially in its Shiite and Sufi forms). Many Jews, Christians, and Muslims believe that prayer can be directed to these beings with realistic hope of the prayer’s efficacy. An especially clear example appears in rabbinic literature: The rabbis regard the worship of the angel Michael as a forbidden form of worship (b. H. ullin 40a, b. Abodah Zarah 42b, t. H. ullin 2:6 [=2:18 in the Zuckermandel edition]). As the talmudic scholar Jose Faur points out regarding this passage, the rabbis “considered ´ Michael a benevolent angel who interceded with God on behalf of Israel. His existence was not in dispute, yet worship of him was considered idolatry” ( Faur, “Biblical,” 14–15), On the worship of angels among Jews, see also Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 9:7=12a. The rabbis, who are usually considered to be monotheistic, acknowledged the existence of this heavenly being other than Yhwh and were concerned only that Jews should not worship him.
8. In short, the narrow definition of monotheism is too narrow: If we use it, then the religion of the Hebrew Bible is not monotheistic; but then neither are Judaism, Christianity with the exception of a few highly philosophical forms of these religions that are historically late and have attracted few adherents. Propp, “Monotheism,” 454–5 n.42: “For the ancient world, functional definitions of ‘monotheism’ and “polytheism” are more useful than philosophical definitions: ‘monotheism’ is monotheistic behavior. Apparently, apart from the minds of philosophers and mystics, there is no such thing as monotheism; compare William James’s obiter dictum, ‘[polytheism] has always been the real religion of common people, and is so still today’ (The Varieties of Religious Experience [New York: New American Library, 1958,396).”

1. It is also possible to define monotheism more broadly: as the belief that there exists one supreme being in the universe, whose will is sovereign over all other beings. These other beings may include some who live in heaven and who are in the normal course of events immortal; but they are unalterably subservient to the one supreme being, except insofar as that being voluntarily relinquishes a measure of control by granting other beings free will. It is thus appropriate to term the supreme being the one God and the other heavenly beings gods or angels. For this definition, see, e.g., Barr, “Problem”; Petersen, “Israel,” 97. So also Faur, “Biblical,” 4. Cf. the similar remark of Morton Smith: “Worship of several deities is compatible with monotheism – one has only to believe, for example, that the supreme (‘true’) deity has created beings inferior to himself but superior to men and has ordained that men should worship them. This belief is expressed in Deut. 4.19 and 32.8” (Morton Smith, Palestinian, 165 n.11). See also Schmidt, Faith, 379, and Labuschagne, Incomparability, 148. Fohrer, History, 103, suggests an identical description of Israelite religion, though he does not term such a belief system monotheism; so too Lohfink, “Zur Geschichte,” 22–5. This view of biblical religion is hardly a new one. Already the thirteenth-century rabbinic commentator Nachmanides acknowledges that the “other gods” whom Israelites are forbidden to worship include real beings who have real power over other nations (though not over Israel, which constitutes God’s personal property). These other beings, Nachmanides explains, are termed “gods” in biblical literature; they are also called “angels.”
2. Their power stems from their appointment over specific nations, though at some point Yhwh will depose them and take direct control over the whole earth. See especially Nachmanides’ commentary to Exodus 20.3(to the words, ynp l[, especially his discussion of the first sort of idolatry, which is worship of real gods with real, if limited and derivative, power), and also his commentary to Leviticus 18.25. On Nachmanides’ understanding of biblical monotheism, see Goshen-Gottstein, “Other Gods.” In this definition, it is not the number of divine beings that matters to monotheism but the relations among them. A theology in which no one deity has ultimate power over all aspects of the world is polytheistic (even if that theology knows of only one deity); so too a theology in which people pray to multiple deities because of a belief that multiple deities have their own power to effect change. A theology in which people pray only to one God in whom all power ultimately resides is monotheistic; so is a theology in which people pray to various heavenly beings to intercede on their behalf with the one God in whom all power ultimately resides. The scholar of African religions E. Bolaju Idowu has termed this sort of monotheism “diffused monotheism”; that is, a type of belief in which God assigns certain tasks to other heavenly beings, whose power or authority comes solely from God. On the applicability of this notion to biblical studies, see Nili Fox, “Concepts,” especially 331. Fox’s own suggestion (344) that biblical/Israelite religion represents “diffused monolatry” rather than diffused monotheism is marred by two problems. She never explains how the former differs from the latter, and she fails to distinguish between Israelite religion and its subset, biblical religion, mixing evidence from both arenas in a manner that smooths over differences that, we see later, are quite revealing.

1. One might be surprised at a definition of monotheism that allows for the existence of many gods, but on further reflection one comes to understand that this definition is no less sensible than the narrow one. On the contrary, it is much more sensible. Let us imagine a theology in which there is one supreme being as well as many other beings who have some degree of free will and self-consciousness. These other beings may be mortal or immortal, or they may be both; that is, they may be able to achieve immortality after they die. In such a theology, it is clear that the supreme being is not alone in the universe and is not the only being who can have some effect on the universe. The fact that these other beings have free will constitutes a limitation, though a voluntary one, on the omnipotence of the supreme being. Now, according to the narrow definition outlined above, such a theology is to be classified as monotheism if these beings live on earth and are called “human,” but it is to be classified as polytheism if these beings live in heaven and are called “angels” or “gods.” There is no reason that we should find the existence of subservient beings in heaven any more surprising in monotheism than the existence of subservient beings on earth. For a kindred attempt to employ the term “monotheism” in a more flexible way that reflects the realities of lived religions (in particular, those of the ancient Near East), see the very important work of Schenker, “Monotheisme,” esp. ´ 437. Schenker succeeds in viewing monotheism from within the religious world of the ancient Near East. Consequently, he is sensitive to how monotheism looks as it emerges from the world of polytheism.
2. Schenker’s definition is essentially identical to my own: “Monotheism must not be defined exclusively in terms of being and non-being. It suffices that a god should be of a nature or a degree so different from all other gods that this deity transcends them in a manner analogous to the transcendence of the gods in relation to human beings” (437–8). Schenker sensibly refers to this sort of monotheism as “a monotheism of transcendence which encompasses polytheism” (448): It is a monotheism of transcendence in the sense that the one God is qualitatively different from all other beings, whether heavenly or mundane, and it encompasses polytheism because it acknowledges the existence of other heavenly beings.

Monolatry and Henotheism:

These terms can be defined in a number of ways (Petersen, “Israel”). One tends to agree with Petersen that “this use of a vocabulary does not appear to have resulted in significant conceptual clarity” (98). They are sometimes used to describe religious systems in which people are permitted only to worship one deity even though the existence of other deities may be acknowledged. Thus we might define monolatry or henotheism so that it is a subset of polytheism. In that case, monolatrous worshippers believe that many gods exist and have real power, but the worshipper nevertheless remains exclusively loyal to just one of those deities. (In this definition, a monotheist is not a monolatrist.) Alternatively, we might define monolatry as a broad category that includes but is not limited to monotheism. In this case, monolatrous worshippers are exclusively loyal to one deity, whether or not they believe that deity is the only one with unalterable power. It is not clear whether the distinction between monotheistic and polytheistic monolatry would even have occurred to many people; many peasants may have worshipped the only deity they ever knew without pausing to wonder whether other deities that mattered in fact existed (Propp, “Monotheism,” 454– 5. See also Nili Fox, “Concepts,” 343). The difference between radical monolatry and radical monotheism in ancient Israel may have been relevant only to an intellectual and not the average Israelite. The term polytheism, then, can either refer to the worship of many deities (which is the typical form of polytheism) or to what I called polytheistic monolatry in the previous paragraph (a relatively rare phenomenon). For convenience, I use the term “polytheism” by itself to refer to the former sort of belief – that is, the worship of many deities.

Israelite Religion vs. Biblical Religion

There are many differing beliefs. It is possible everyone was polytheist. Similarly, it is possible that the vast majority of ancient Israelites were polytheistic, but that a small minority, whose writings are preserved in the biblical canon, were monotheistic. There is little reason to doubt that the Bible portrays, among other things, popular religion. As William Propp notes, legal and prophetic texts in the Bible support the interests of small farmers or peasants, not wealthy landowners (Propp, “Monotheism,” 548); these texts and also narrative texts are often skeptical of royalty as well. On the limited nature of the elite vs. popular distinction for the study of ancient Israel, see further Propp’s astute comments on 550. This is not to say that such a contrast is never useful; Ugaritic written material, in contrast to biblical material, demonstrably reflects the concerns of an elite group in an urban setting.

The questions that will be answered, “Were the ancient Israelites monotheists?” and “Are the documents found in the Hebrew Bible monotheistic?”

Were the Ancient Israelites Monotheists?

Biblical Evidence

As we turn to our first question, the data from biblical texts are clear and consistent: Biblical authors inform us that a great many Israelites – at times, perhaps even most Israelites – were polytheistic. This is true for the period in which the Israelites wandered in the desert, which is described in the Books of Exodus and Numbers; it is true for the earliest period of Israelite settlement in Canaan, which is described in the Book of Judges; and it is true through the period of the monarchies described in Kings. The Book of Judges narrates a repeating cycle of polytheistic worship by the Israelites, followed by punishment by Yhwh, forgiveness from Yhwh, and further polytheism on the people’s part. The Book of Kings puts tremendous emphasis on the polytheism of Israelites both north and south. Some kings (for example, Hezekiah and Josiah in the south, Jehu in the north) are portrayed as having been exclusively loyal to Yhwh, but quite a few (Manasseh in the south and Ahab in the north, to take two notorious examples) encouraged the worship of many deities in the temples they sponsored. Prophetic books dating from this era paint the same picture. The prophets excoriate Israelites north and south for worshipping Baal and various other deities, whose names some prophets do not deign to report, merely terming them “nothings” (!ylyla).

Israelites before the exile worshipped many gods. An example is found in William Dever’s “Did God Have a Wife? Archaeology and Folk Religion in Ancient Israel”. He maintains that their failure to mention these figurines results from their deliberate attempt to suppress any reference to them: “They did not wish to acknowledge the popularity and the powerful influence of these images” (Dever, Did God, 184). In fact, however, biblical authors constantly acknowledge the widespread polytheism of Israelites, and they mention Israelite goddess worship specifically on a number of occasions (e.g., Jeremiah 7.18, 44.17–19). Israelite authors (rather like many later Jewish and contemporary Israeli authors) love talking about how awful their own people are; self-criticism, sometimes of an exaggerated sort, is one of the most prominent hallmarks of biblical (and later Jewish) literature. When Dever attempts to portray the Bible as whitewashing Israelite history, he fails to attend to the fact that biblical authors are in fact obsessed with tarnishing Israelite history. Although they do not always realize it, fine scholars like Dever or Ziony Zevit (to name just two recent examples) who argue that preexilic Israelites were polytheists seek not to overturn the biblical picture of Israelite religion but in significant ways to confirm it. On the other hand, scholars like William Foxwell Albright, Yehezkel Kaufmann, or Jeffrey Tigay who minimize the extent of preexilic polytheism reject the biblical picture as inaccurate or vastly overstated.

Archaeological Evidence

Two types of archaeological data suggest that polytheism was extremely rare in preexilic Israel, though not unheard of, whereas a third type may suggest that Israelites worshipped a variety of deities – especially goddesses. The first sort of evidence comes from ancient Israelite inscriptions (that is, from what scholars call epigraphic evidence), and especially from the personal names theymention (thatis,fromwhat scholars call onomastic evidence). Ancient Semites often gave their children names that contain a statement about or prayer to a deity: Thus in Mesopotamia we know kings named “Esarhaddon” or “Ashur-ah ˘ a-idin,” which means “[The god] Ashur has given a brother,” and “Nebuchudrezzar” or “Nabu-kudurri-us.ur,” which means “[O god] Nabu, protect my first-born son!” Ancient Israelites also gave their children names of this sort (known as “theophoric” names). From early monarchic times on (that is, centuries before the exile), personal names that mention the names of gods other than Yhwh are exceedingly rare. This finding suggests that worship of gods other than Yhwh may have been less common than the biblical texts would lead us to believe. The censures of prophets and scribes whose work is found in the Bible, Tigay surmises, must have exaggerated the extent of the problem they denounced (Tigay, You Shall, 178–80). The weight of epigraphic data from the ninth through the sixth centuries bce testifies in behalf of the “Yhwh only” stream of Israelite religion, particularly but not only in the south. From the Mesha stele to the finds from Arad, Lachish, and Ramat Rachel, for example, Yhwh is the only named deity in Israelite inscriptions, and Yhwh’s name is mentioned over 30 times (Miller, “Absence,” 198 n.2).

1. For a discussion of the reasons biblical authors overstated the extent of Israelite polytheism, see especially Kaufmann, Toledot, 659–62, 667–72. At least one of the reasons suggested by Kaufmann cannot be correct. Kaufmann argued that the biblical authors were so unfamiliar with real polytheism that they erroneously attributed to polytheists the belief he calls fetishism – that is, the idea that gods and goddesses really were present in idols; indeed, that the gods were the physical objects themselves. Many scholars who criticize Kaufmann note that he overlooked the possibility that the biblical authors engaged in satire in these descriptions. Even more importantly, the Mesopotamian m¯ıs pˆı and pit pˆı texts published after Kaufmann completed his work show that both Kaufmann and the scholars who criticized him were wrong to assume that the biblical descriptions were inaccurate (for a discussion of these Mesopotamian texts, see Chapter 1). On the basis of these texts, we now know that the biblical authors in fact understood the attitude toward cult statues correctly: The neighbors of the Israelites did believe a deity was present in a s.almu – though, as I argue in Chapter 1, they did not believe that the deity was exclusively present in the statue.
2. Thus we now know two things that neither Kaufmann nor his critics knew: (1) Ancient Near Eastern polytheists were not fetishist (because they did not completely identify the god and the statue), though they did regard the god as literally present in the statue. (2) The biblical authors did not think their neighbors were fetishists; rather, they likely understood their neighbors’ ideas about divine presence in a statue and represented it fairly accurately, if mockingly. It should further be noted that Kaufmann’s mistaken idea that the Israelites believed their neighbors to be fetishists is hardly central to Kaufmann’s thesis about the prevalence of Israelite monotheism; it is perfectly possible to reject this specific claim of Kaufmann’s while accepting his larger thesis.

The second sort of evidence comes from an extraordinarily thorough study of ancient Israelite art. Comparing the Israelite and non-Israelite seals, Keel and his student Christoph Uehlinger noted a startling pattern. Non-Israelite seals portray a wide variety of deities; often more than one deity is present on a single seal. But Israelite seals differ from non-Israelite seals in several respects. First, they tend not to portray more than one deity. This finding suggests that Israelites really did tend to obey the command, “You shall not have any other gods besides Me” (Exodus 20.3). Second, they almost never provide a picture of their deity; rather, the deity is represented symbolically, most often by a sun disk. This finding suggests that Israelites, already in the early preexilic period, tended to obey the command, “You should not make any sculpted image or picture” of a deity (Exodus 20.4) (Mettinger, No Graven, 145). Mettinger discusses the Israelite aversion to images in the larger context of Northwest Semitic religions, which displayed similar characteristics, though to a lesser degree, already in the Bronze Age. Consequently, Mettinger concludes, “Israelite aniconism is as old as Israel itself and not a late innovation. The express prohibition of images is just the logical conclusion of a very long development” (145). For a further defense of this thesis, see Mettinger, “Aniconism”; Mettinger, “Conversation”; Hendel, “Aniconism”; and Lewis, “Divine Images.”

1. Evidence of polytheism in ancient Israel does crop up here and there, especially in the seventh century b.c.e, but much less frequently than in seals from other cultures. Other forms of art (statuary, graffiti on walls) provide similar evidence. Precisely as Israel begins to emerge in the highlands of Canaan at the beginning of the Iron Age, anthropomorphic representations of deities became vastly less common in those highlands, though they never disappear completely even in Israelite contexts (Keel and Uehlinger, Gods). On the decline of anthropomorphic representation of deities early in Iron Age Israel, see especially the useful summary in 173–4 (but note exceptions to this tendency, 306–16, 341–9). On monotheism and monolatry, see especially 277–81. On the emergence of greater polytheistic tendencies in the late preexilic period, see 323–49; on a reaction to this development and a greater stress on avoiding any portrayals of the deity, even symbolic ones such as a sun disk, see 354–67. Uehlinger, incidentally, later recanted these conclusions, arguing that preexilic Israelite religion was thoroughly polytheistic; see Uehlinger, “Anthropomorphic.” The treatment of the evidence in the earlier work remains the more convincing. See the critique of the later work of Uehlinger in Mettinger, “Conversation,” 278–81.
2. In short, these kinds of evidence suggest that Israelites were largely monolatrous – though they do not allow us to decide whether their monolatry was monotheistic or polytheistic in nature. Onomastic and iconographic data are not the only types of archaeological evidence available, however. Small statues of female figures have been uncovered from many ancient Israelite sites, and many scholars believe they demonstrate that Israelites worshipped a goddess or goddesses. These statues are found overwhelmingly in domestic settings (that is, in the remains of Israelite homes, sometimes in graves, but not in cultic sites or temples). Thus they may inform us especially about how religion was practiced in the ancient Israelite family, rather than about public or official cults sponsored by the king or by communal leaders. Three types of statues have been identified (Dever, Did God, 176–9).

• (1) A small number of figurines have been found in Israelite sites from the early Iron Age – that is, the thirteenth through eleventh centuries, the era in which Israel first began to emerge in the highlands in the center of Canaan (Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, 164 and 202, and cf. Dever, Did God, 176–7).

• (2) Figurines portraying a woman, usually clothed, holding a circular object have been found in Israelite sites from the tenth century on; most date to the seventh century. Scholars disagree about who this woman is and what she is holding. Dever argues that she is a goddess. Identifying the disk as a bread cake, he connects her with the worship of the Queen of Heaven condemned by the sixth-century prophet Jeremiah in 7.18 and 44.17–19 (Dever, Did God,177–9. Mazar, Archaeology,501–2). In short, they do not provide evidence of Israelite worship of a goddess (Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, 164–6).

• (3) By far the most common figurines – literally hundreds have been found – depict a woman with very prominent, often pendulous, breasts; unlike the figurines from the first category, however, these figurines do not display the woman’s genitalia, prominently or otherwise. Instead, at the bottom of these figurines one finds a sort of pedestal that resembles either a tree trunk (Dever, Did God, 179), or a woman’s robe (Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, 332). These figurines, made of terra cotta or clay, first appear in the archaeological record later than the first two types of figurines; most date to the eighth and seventh centuries b.c.e (see Kletter, Judean Pillar-Figurines, with a review of literature in 10–28 and 73–81).

What were the figurines in this third category? How did they function, and what did they depict? Keel and Uehlinger, who elsewhere highlight the monolatrous nature of Israelite worship, consider these objects to be representations of a goddess and hence of Israelite worship of more than one deity (Keel and Uehlinger,Gods,333–6). If so, the polytheism they evince was quite widespread in the eighth and seventh centuries were exceedingly common: The archaeologist Raz Kletter notes that they “have been found in almost every Iron Age II excavation in Judah” (Kletter, Judean Pillar-Figurines, 10), and Keel and Uehlinger point out that they were found in nearly half the private homes excavated in Beersheba and Tel Beit-Mirsim dating to that era (Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, 328). Dever regards these figurines as talismans that worked magic, especially in difficult moments such as childbirth and caring for infants. It is not clear that such a talisman in fact depicts a goddess; it is just as likely that it depicts a human female whose large breasts symbolize (or rather help engender through sympathetic magic) a woman’s ability to give birth and to nurture. Indeed, the archaeologist and biblical scholar Carol Meyers points out significant differences between these figurines and statues of goddesses known from ancient Canaan. Statues of the divine, she notes (Meyers, Discovering, 162).

1. Asherah Worship in Ancient Israel?
2. Did Israelites worship this goddess? Two pieces of evidence are especially relevant: the eighth-century inscriptions from Kuntillet Ajrud and Khirbet el-Qom and a tenth-century cult stand from Tanakh. Hence these inscriptions do not provide direct evidence of Asherah worship among Israelites – though the mere existence of a cultic pole of a type that had once been sacred to Asherah (as its name indicates) shows that Asherah worship must have played a role at some earlier stage in the religion of the Israelites or their immediate forebears. The second piece of evidence comes from an unusually well-preserved cult stand dating to the tenth century (Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, 157–60; Dever, Did God, 151–4, 219–21). This cult stand was discovered in 1968 at Taanakh, a northern Israelite site located approximately five miles southeast of Megiddo in the Jezreel valley (On the archaeological evidence, see Mazar, Archaeology, 333). It seems clear that the goddess on the first and third level is Asherah (Hestrin, “Cult Stand,” 67–71; Taylor, Yhwh, 28–9; and the very clear summary in Dever, Did God, 220–1).

In the top register, Taylor suggests, we again find Yhwh flanked by cherubs. This time, Yhwh is represented symbolically but not literally by a sun disk. The association of Yhwh with the sun is known from a few biblical passages, such as Psalm 84.10–12 (ese Mark Smith, “Near Eastern Background”; Mark Smith, Early, 115–24; Janowski, “JHWH und der Sonnengott”, Taylor, Yhwh, 24–91 and 92–256). Two passages, 2 Kings 23.11 and Ezekiel 6.1–7, 8.16, depict sun worship in the Jerusalem temple. y. Rather, they may have intended to bow down to Yhwh as a sun god. The association of Yhwh and the sun is also known from Israelite iconography (Keel and Uehlinger, 343–7). In short, it seems plausible that the top register of the Taanakh cult stand portrays Yhwh on a symbolic level as the sun, thus exemplifying precisely the equation that 2 Kings, Ezekiel, and Psalm 19 find problematic. : The cult stand pairs Yhwh with the goddess Asherah. Many scholars have noted that such a pairing is not surprising. Asherah was the wife of El in Ugarit, and both the name El and imagery associated with him are attributed to Yhwh throughout the Hebrew Bible (Cross, Canaanite Myth, 44–60, El’s relation to Yhwh in L’Heureux, Rank, 49–70, and Mark Smith, Origins, 139–48).
That some Israelites loyal to Yhwh might assume that He had a wife, and that wife would be Asherah, is to be expected (Hadley, Cult, 206–9, and of John Day, “Asherah (JBL Article),” 392–3). We can state that, at least at an early stage of Israelite history and at least in the north, the goddess Asherah was worshipped alongside Yhwh.

1. Were the Ancient Israelites Monotheists?
2. Much of the archaeological evidence (onomastic and iconographic data) suggests that most Israelites in the preexilic period worshipped only one deity. At the same time, both types also allow us to speak of early preexilic Israelite monolatry as well, and thus to note areas of discontinuity between Israel and its neighbors.

1. Is the Hebrew Bible Monotheistic?
2. Do they imagine Yhwh to be unrivaled among heavenly beings and in exclusive control of all powers in the universe? Or do they imagine Yhwh to be one among many deities, to whom, for a variety of historical reasons, the Israelites have pledged fealty?

Poor Evidence for Biblical Monotheism:

The most familiar texts that emphasize that Israelites must worship only one God provide no data regarding this question. “You shall have no other gods besides Me,” Yhwh tells the Israelites at the opening of the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20.3). Is this because the other gods have no power, or is it simply because Yhwh, having liberated the Israelites from Egypt, has first claim on the Israelites’ religious affections? The text gives absolutely no information that would allow us to answer this question one way of the other (Muller, “Gott,” ¨ 136–7). Other texts seem at first glance to support the idea that the Israelites were monotheistic, but they provide no real support when viewed in their own cultural context. “Who is like you among the gods, Yhwh? Who is like you, exalted in holiness, acknowledged as awesome, performing wonders?” Moses and the Israelites sing at the shore of the Reed Sea (Exodus 15.11; cf. 1 Kings 8.23; Isaiah 40.18; Jeremiah 10.6–7; Psalms 35.10, 71.19, 89.9). Such a verse sounds tailor made to answer our question, because it insists on an essential distinction between Yhwh and all other heavenly beings. It can be said to function in a genuinely monotheistic manner) (Mark Smith, Origins, 50). But a line like this does not always function that way. A god might have been called the greatest or the only god because at a particular moment that god was of paramount importance to the worshipper (Gottlieb, “El,” 163). Alternatively, prayers might indulge in exaggeration and flattery (Morton Smith, “Common Theology,” 139).

1. Only a larger context demonstrates that the passage is monotheistic by showing, for example, that the deity lacks family, cannot be challenged by other gods, or assigned them their minor roles. Nothing like this appears in the poem in which Exodus 15.11 (“Who is like you among the gods, O Yhwh?”) appears, so that we cannot cite it as an example of early monotheism in Israel. Such a verse could have been recited by a monotheistic monolatrist, by a polytheistic monolatrist, or even a nonmonolatrous polytheist (Contra, e.g., Halpern, “Brisker,” 88).
2. Is it possible to distinguish between a monotheistic God who rules over the gods absolutely, on the one hand, and a polytheistic god who governs other gods without completely dominating them, on the other? One can imagine two models of divine kingship: a monotheistic one, in which members of a divine retinue praise the one God and carry out that God’s wishes; and a polytheistic one, in which the king is first among equals, mightiest to be sure, but in control of the universe neither automatically nor permanently. Conceptually, the difference between a monotheistic council and a pagan pantheon is clear: The divine retinue of the monotheistic god might be compared to the American cabinet, where secretaries of various departments carry out the president’s policies and serve at the president’s whim. The polytheistic pantheon resembles the British cabinet, where each minister may have an independent power base and in which all cabinet members, the prime minister included, may be dismissed at the whim of lower politicians in Parliament or (at least in theory) of a higher and more august, if otiose, authority.

Deuteronomy 32.8-9:

According to this conception, just as there were stereotypically seventy gods, so there were seventy nations (Mark Smith, Origins, 55, and cf. 48–9), each of which had its own god (this would have meant Ashur for the Assyrians, for example, and Marduk for the Babylonians, though Deuteronomy does not deign to mention these minor gods by name). But the high God Yhwh kept one nation as His own property, and it was their responsibility to pray only to Him.

1. Strong Evidence for Biblical Monotheism: The Contribution of Yehezkel Kaufmann
2. The divine council depicted in the Hebrew Bible is something else altogether. In Psalm 29 and Isaiah 6, the divine retinue exists to praise Yhwh, not to battle Him. In Genesis 1.26, they are informed, but not really consulted, regarding the creation of humanity. Some scholars object to the idea that Genesis 1.26 implies a divine council was present at the creation because the idea that God would consult with other divine beings at the creation conflicts with the major thrust of the creation account in Genesis 1, which is that God created the world by Himself (so Cassuto, Genesis, 55–6). In fact, God is not described as consulting them but simply as informing them of his decision. Indeed the next verse pointedly states that God created humanity – and whatever beings God addresed in 1.26 have no role. These verses do not portray any group efforts or deliberation. Verse 26 deliberately emphasizes the contrast to the polytheistic (especially Mesopotamian) creation stories that serve as the backdrop and foil for Genesis 1. By alluding in 1.26 to the motif of group action that appears in other creation accounts, the text highlights the absence of the motif more acutely than it would have done by leaving out mention of it altogether.

(The same logic underlies the reference in 1.21 to God’s creating the !ynynth [as opposed to God’s fight with Tanin]; it may also underlie the description in 1.9–10 of God’s creation of !ymyh [as opposed to a fight with Yam], and the reference in 1.2 to God’s wind hovering over the impersonal !wht [as opposed to a fight with Tiamit in which winds are wielded against her as a weapon]. For more on this aspect of the rhetoric in Genesis 1, see Childs, Myth and Reality, 42–3.) Further, Garr, Image, 203–4, points out that in verse 26, God says to the angels, “Let’s hc[ a human,” using a less restricted word for creation. But in verse 27 God makes humanity on God’s own – and the verb is arb now, a verb used exclusively with the subject God in the Hebrew Bible (as noted already by Melammed, “Linguistic,” 1 n.1). Further, Garr points out that though God says “Let’s make humanity in our image (wnmlxb)” in 26, God makes the humans “in His image (wmlxb)” in 27. (The last point is also made by Bird, “Male and Female,” 144 n.51).

Kaufmann emphasizes a further difference between the gods of pagan religions and the position of Yhwh in the Hebrew Bible (Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:245, 419–22). Kaufmann emphasizes the special importance of the relationship between Yhwh and matter, and, more broadly, between Yhwh and other forces in the universe (Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:245, 447–8. See also Frymer-Kensky, In the Wake, 86).