Ibn Taymiyya on Imāmī Shīʿism in his Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya (Prof. Vilozny)

Article

1. Introduction
2. Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya fī naqḍ kalām al-shīʿa al-qadariyya is Ibn Taymi yyaʼs (d. 728/1328) monumental refutation of Minhāj al-karāma fī maʿrifat al-im āma, the work of his renowned Imāmī-Shīʿī contemporary, al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325). As one of Ibn Taymiyyaʼs largest theological works and given growing interest in him in the last decades, several studies have recently been devoted to an examination of various aspects of Minhāj al-sunna (Hoover 2007; Bori 2007, 5‒56; Michot 2014, 109‒149; al-Jamil 2015, 229‒231).

Although Ibn Taymiyyaʼs opinions on the Shīʿa can be inferred also from several earlier texts (Hoover 2018), his choice in Minhāj al-sunna to refute one by one al-Ḥillīʼs arguments in Minhāj al-karāma, resulted in a systematic work in which Ibn Tay miyyaʼs conception of Imāmī Shīʿism is given unprecedented elaboration. Along the lines of al-Ḥillīʼs treatise, it addresses a variety of Imāmī core beliefs as well as the rational arguments, scriptural proofs, and historical evidence that according to al-Ḥillī justify adhering to the Imāmī faith. Ibn Taymiyyaʼs opinion on various Shīʿī branches – the Imāmīs, Ismāʿīlīs, Nuṣayrīs – as it comes across in several of his earlier texts was discussed. Of relevance to our discussion is Ibn Taymiyyaʼs letter in 704/1305 to the Mamlūk sultan, al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥam mad b. Qalāwūn (d. 741/1341) in which he criticizes the Imāmī Shīʿī belief in the hidden Imam and their inclination to adopt Muʿtazilī theological positions (these themes are discussed at length below). For the relevant passages in the letter, see Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Hādī (d. 744/1344) (2002), al-ʿUqūd, 153‒154. Other writings in which Ibn Taymiyya attacks the Imām iyya that were discussed by Hoover include: his fatwa against the Shīʿīs which was written at about the same time of the letter to the sultan (see Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ (2004), 28, 468‒501 and Ibn Taymiyyaʼs longest fatwa against the Mongols (Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ (2004), 28, 509‒543) whose writing, according to Hoover, should have taken place following Öljeitüʼs conversion to Imāmī Shīʿism (on which see the note below) around 709/1310.

Ibn Taymiyyaʼs declaration that the author of the treatise – to whom, by the way, he never refers by name but only as “the Rafiḍī” – is among the most misguided people, for the benefit of the believers he consented to clarify the flaws, shortcomings, and weaknesses of al-Ḥillīʼs treatise. This decision ultimately led to the composition of Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya, a substan tial work in which, as part of a comprehensive attack on the Shīʿa, Ibn Taymiyya systematically tackles the issues raised by al-Ḥillī, unfolds his own views on a variety of related themes, and engages with different schools of thought. Generally speaking, Ibn Taymiyya asserts that al-Ḥillīʼs arguments could be divided into two kinds: such that are based on a revealed text (naqliyya) and those that are based on reason (ʿaqliyya). In both fields, Ibn Taymiyya argues, al-Ḥillī went entirely astray, to the degree that he could be compared to those unbelievers who say in Surat al-Mulk [Q 67:10] “If we had only listened or under stood (law kunnā nasmaʿu aw naʿqilu), we would not have been of the inhabitants of the Blaze” (Ibn Taymiyya (1962), Minhāj al-sunna, 1, 4). This is also the case when he describes the creedal and ritual commonalities between the Shīʿīs, the Jews, and the Christians. Despite the striking similarities between the three groups, Ibn Taymiyya concludes that the Rāfiḍa – on account of their claim that the companions of the Prophet were the most evil among the commu nity – are the worst.

Among the numerous “stupidities” that Ibn Taymiyya ascribes to the Shīʿīs is their refusal to drink water from channels that were dug by Yazīd [b. Muʿāwiya (d. 64/683), the Umayyad caliph during the battle of Karbalāʾ (60/680)], or to eat berries from al-Shām, apparently since they were grown in previous Umayyad territories. Ibn Taymiyya also mentions the Shīʿīsʼ reluctance to use the number ten in either speech or action – for example to build a house upon ten columns – to avoid association with the ten companions of the Prophet to whom entrance to paradise was guaranteed during their lifetime. Ibn Taymiyya is also well aware of the fact that the Shīʿa comprises different branches and admits that the Imāmīs and Zaydīs may be innocent of some of the blameworthy beliefs and deeds that are peculiar to the extremist Shīʿīs (al-ghāliya) and the Shīʿī masses (al-ʿāmma). Nevertheless, he concludes, it is inevitable that a religious school whose foundations are based on ignorance would lead diverse factions to adopt falsities. Prior to undertaking the task of addressing al-Ḥillīʼs arguments systematically, Ibn Taymiyya conveys an additional preliminary res ervation, namely, that not everything the Shīʿīs say is wrong. Rather, things in which they are in agreement with ahl al-sunna wa-l-ḥadīth are correct and others, in which they differ, are wrong (Kohlberg 2014, 175‒177). With regard to al-Ḥillīʼs scholarly tradition, Ibn Taymiyya remarks that al-Ḥillī followed in the footsteps of previous Rāfiḍī scholars such as al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) and his students, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Karājikī (d. 449/1057) and Abū al-Qāsim al-Mūsawī [al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā] (d. 436/1044), as well as Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) and others (Ibn Taymiyya (1962), Minhāj al-sunna, 1, 36).

At any rate, Ibn Taymiyya accuses the Rāfiḍa as a whole – including al-Ḥillī and his abovementioned predecessors (al-Mufīdʼs followers to whom Ibn Taym iyya refers as shuyūkh al-rāfiḍa) – for being not only incompetent in studying a subject and building an argument, but also for being entirely ignorant in the science of ḥadith. While the first part of this accusation is purely polemical, the second part, which concerns the science of ḥadīth, is backed by Ibn Taymiyyaʼs observation that these Shīʿī authorities relied on untrustworthy transmitters as well as on defective chains of transmission (bn Taymiyya (1962), Minhāj al-sunna, 1, 36‒37). Indeed, compared to Sunnī Islam, the Shīʿī science of ḥadīth criticism – of both isnād and matn – came into being relatively late, only decades after the onset of the twelfth Imamʼs greater occultation in 329/941 (Brown 2009, 133‒135). In some early Imāmī compilations of ḥadīth, including two of The Four Books (al-Ṣadūqʼs Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh and al-Ṭūsīʼs al-Isti bṣār fīmā ukhtulifa min al-akhbār), many chains of transmission were dropped by the authors for a variety of considerations (Kohlberg 2014, 168‒169). Furthermore, when early Imāmī ḥadīth compilations – including the canonical – were scrutinized by later Imāmī scholars, from al-Mufīdʼs generation onward, traditions they incorporated were at times dismissed as forged or as based on untrustworthy transmitters (Brown 2009, 134‒135). Thus, in criticizing the Imāmī Shīʿī ḥadīth scholarship, Ibn Taymiyya echoes the dis course within Shīʿī scholarly circles in the first centuries after the occultation.

The first case in which Ibn Taymiyya demonstrates a thorough familiarity with the evolution of the Shīʿī theological discourse revolves around the concept of God. Al-Ḥillī declares at the beginning of his Minhāj al-karāma that there are numerous reasons why the Imāmī belief is the only one that should be followed. The first reason is the Imāmī notion that God is eternal, that anything apart from Him is created (muḥdath), that He is one, that He is neither a body (jism) nor a substance (jawhar), that He is not a composite of various elements [on account of His oneness], is not an accident and is not in a location or place [makān]. Thus, according to al-Ḥillī, the Imāmiyya drew a clear line between God and His creation.36 Ibn Taymiyya starts off with an argument to which I alluded earlier and asserts that the majority of early Imāmī mutakallimūn held the opposite view. Among the names Ibn Taymiyya mentions we find again Hishām b. al-Ḥakam, Hishām b. Sālim [al-Jawālīqī] and Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Qummī alongside three additional names: Zurāra b. Aʿyan (d. 150/767)37, Abū Mālik al-Ḥaḍramī38 and ʿAlī b. Maytham. Al-Ḥillīʼs statement on the Imāmī notion of Godʼs unity, Ibn Taymiyya argues, is therefore not representative of the Imāmiyya as a whole. Since it contradicts the early Imāmī view of tawḥīd, either the later or the earlier view is necessar ily wrong, says Ibn Taymiyya. It is remarkable in Ibn Taymiyyaʼs opinion that al-Ḥillī, who must have been aware of this intergenerational contradiction, does not refute his predecessorsʼ claims that God is in a specific place, that He does move, and that He is characterized by the occurrence of accidents (taqūmu bihi al-ḥawādith).42 This is particularly odd, Ibn Taymiyya stresses, in light of the fact that the early mutakallimūn lived in the time of the Imams and were therefore better acquainted with their teachings.4
The second example I would like to discuss briefly is the Shīʿī belief that the Qurʾān is created (al-qurʾān makhlūq). Ibn Taymiyyaʼs way of addressing this problem is, in principle, similar to his approach toward the Shīʿī perception of God that was discussed earlier. Namely, he argues that there is again a disturbing gap between the earlier Shīʿī view and the later, Shīʿī-Muʿtazilī one. The inter esting thing is that, this time, his argument revolves around an ascription of a teaching on the topic to the sixth Imam, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), upon whose religious authority, we are told, the Sunnīs are clearly in agreement (Ibn Taymiyya (1962), Minhāj al-sunna, 2, 181). Accord ing to Ibn Taymiyya, when al-Ṣādiq was asked whether the Qurʾān is creating or created, he replied: “it is neither creating nor created, rather it is Godʼs speech” (laysa bi-khāliqin wa-lā makhlūqin wa-lākinnahu kalāmu allāh). That the Qurʾān was the divine speech which is not created, Ibn Taymiyya elaborates, was the view of Aḥmad [Ibn Ḥanbal] (d. 241/855) during the miḥna;51 it was also held by scholars of the first generations (al-salaf) who followed in this matter the companions of the Prophet and it is agreed upon among most religious author ities (aʾimmat al-muslimīn). He stresses, however, that all the latter asserted that although God is eternally speaking, His speech is subordinated to His will (mashīʾa) and capacity or power to act (qudra) (Ibn Taymiyya (1962), Minhāj al-sunna, 2, 181‒182; Van Ess, Josef, “Ibn Kullāb,” EI2 and Van Ess 1990, 173‒233, as well as Bin Balmi 2016, 215‒224). Thus, it does not contradict the notion which according to Ibn Taymiyya is shared by Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and the rest of Muslim religious authorities, that God is the creator of everything, anything apart of God is created (muḥdath) and nothing in this world shares Godʼs eter nity (qidam).

Finally, in Ibn Taymiyyaʼs view, the belief in a hidden Imam also stands in contradiction to the existence of the corpus of Shīʿī ḥadīth whose lionʼs share is attributed to the first eleven Imams. If this material is genuine and true, we are told, it should suffice as a means of adhering to Godʼs commandments and hence the role of the hidden Imam as a divine favor would be redundant.65 This argument may sound reasonable to those familiar with the titles of two of the Shīʿaʼs Four Books that were compiled during the Imam’s occultation: al-Ku laynīʼs al-Kāfī (The Sufficient) and Ibn Bābawayhʼs Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh ([A book for] The One Whose faqīh is not Reachable). Their titles express precisely the idea that their content – Imāmī ḥadīth – can provide the Shīʿī believer with answers to all possible queries.66 On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya goes on, if the corpus of Imāmī ḥadīth is false, or at least partly false, since the Imam is hidden, he cannot help to discern the true from the false.67 The title of another one of the Four Books, al-Istibṣār fīmā ukhtulifa min al-akhbār (Seeking Clarity on that which Reports Differ), alludes to the immense effort al-Ṭūsī put into discerning from the bulk of Imāmī traditions the ones a believer has to follow.68 Here, too, it appears that Ibn Taymiyya must have had in mind the equivalent Sunnī corpus of ḥadīth which for him, given its valid criticism, constitutes a sufficient source of knowl edge alongside the Qurʾān.