Introduction

The concept of power in Philo’s work is probably best studied in his treatise De vita Mosis and his Quaestiones et Solutiones in Exodum 1–2. These two works thematically overlap in their interest in the second book of the Jewish Pentateuch and the description of the Tent of Meeting as a prototype of the Jerusalem Temple which, as Philo understands it, served to represent God’s power. It should be noted that Philo’s exegesis is corroborated by the Book of Exodus itself (especially in the case of De vita Mosis, whereas the scope of the commentary on Exodus is narrower, covering only Ex 7:2–28:38) by the description of the manifestations of divine power, both before the event of the exodus and in its course. This is explicitly attested by Ex 9:16 where Yahweh says that he intended to “show” his power ( חֹכַּ / ἰσχύς) to the Pharaoh, meaning that he not only wanted to do something powerful but also to demonstrate his power, so that people might understand the meaning of their exodus, as they were supposed both to be delivered from slavery and know themselves to be free (cf. also חֹכַּ / ἰσχύς in Ex 9:16; 15:6; 32:11; Num 14:13; Deut 4:37; 9:29; זֹע / βοηθός “Helper” in Ex 15:2). The Hebrew God, Yahweh, was perceived as a personification of power, as the holder and master of the power with which he manifests himself in the world.

Philo’s concept of power

Typically, contemporary Hebrew writings associate power with life, history, and the universe. The Hebrew Old Testament texts use a variety of expressions for power (Jiří Hoblík, Myšlenkově schůdné cesty mezi Jeruzalémem a Athénami, vol. 2, 20–38) even at the lexicographical level, not to mention its metaphorical use. Thus, we are presented with an interesting semantic interplay of mutually related expressions (e.g. דָי / βραχίων “arm, hand” in Ex 32:11 a.o.; ַע וֹר ְז / βραχίων “arm” in Deut 9:29) (Helmer Ringgren, “ ַח ֹכּ koaḥ,” in Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament, vol. 4, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry, col. 131). Apparently unacquainted with the Hebrew Bible, Philo more or less consistently employed the LXX usage, yet in contrast to it, in an effort to disclose the deeper allegorical meaning of the Scriptures, he preferred the latter expression, i.e. δύναμις. **The reason for this preference was presumably his desire to remain faithful to the language of philosophers, showing that the Torah said the same things as they had been saying whilst being far superior to them. The most notable instance of Philo’s philosophical position in terms of the concept of power seems to be his teaching of two powers:** the creative (ποιητική) and the ruling (βασιλική) power, also called θεός, “God”, and κύριος, “Lord” (cf. Abr. 121; Mut. 28–29 etc.). Their meaning is chiefly cosmological, yet they are the two highest among, according to Philo, an infinite number of powers (Deus 79).

It is in these particular aspects that the philosophical tradition provides one of the sources of Philo’s doctrine of power, alongside the biblical and later Jewish traditions, i.e., the rabbinic practice of connecting the two divine names with middot, “measures, norms” – the merciful and the punitive – and the association of the tetragrammaton with divine grace and the term “God” with divine judgment, although Philo identifies the divine names with the aspects of God in exactly opposite ways to those in which the rabbis do (Alan F. Segal, The Other Judaisms of Late Antiquity, 19; David Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria, 21–22; Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, 223–226; Termini, Le potenze di Dio, 92–96).

Philo seems to have had a good reason for separating the concept of power from the concept of God. What the Jews mean by “God” is, in Philo, best termed ὁ ὤν (τὸ ὄν), “the Being”, (and, given this identification, he does not hesitate to speak of “God’s powers”, cf. QE 2.65; Cher. 106) because what is meant is not just any particular essence: everything comprehensible to humans results from the activity of the two powers. The two powers thus accentuate the tran scendence of the Being as such. At the same time, they help to structure the perspective of human insight: from understandable phenomena through signif icantly deficient comprehension (e.g. regarding the powers) to the completely incomprehensible Being. The term “God” represents a generally religious concept, but from the Jewish perspective it is characterized by exclusivity, and in Philo it is therefore appropri ately replaced by the philosophical term “the Being.” Philo sometimes justifies the term “God” with a biblical account of the Creation (cf. Plant. 86; QG 2.16). Besides, the form “θεός” refers to the contemporary Greek etymology, which con nected it to the hypothetical root “θε-”, meaning “to lay, to organize” (John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists 80 B. C. to A. D. 220, 162). This cor responds to the function of creator and agent of the good, which Philo attributes to the power called God: in Opif. 21 he speaks of universe-creating power that draws on the good, not incidentally referring to “one of the old ones”, i.e. Plato (David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses, 133–134).

According to De specialibus legibus 1.46–47, the powers surround the Being as a guard (cf. Spec. 1.45). The powers themselves are invisible and accessible to the mind only (νοετός; 46). Furthermore, they are incomprehensible in essence (ἀκατάληπτοι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν), “formless” (ἄμορφος) and do not change or diminish (47; see also below). They are therefore characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. However, they are actively involved in shaping ideas when they “shape all things and organize what was disorderly (ἄτακτος), and limit, define and shape the boundless (ἄπειρος) and formless (ἀόριστος) and even change the worse into the better” (48) – so they can be inferred from their effects, when they are giving quality (ποιότης) and form (μορφή) to individual things (47). If we understand power in terms of its simplest meaning, i.e. a general prerequisite for movement and activity, it has a structural analogy in Plato’s conception: “. . . powers are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do . . .” Yet in Philo, δύναμις is mostly what precedes things or events. This precedence is grounded in his theo-cosmological approach, while his theology can be described as “meta-cosmic theology” (Mauro Bonazzi, “Towards Transcendence: Philo and the Renewal of Platonism in the Early Imperial Age,” in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, ed. Francesca Alesse, 246). In the theo-cosmological sense, Philo uses δύναμις chiefly in the plural for the two major powers, which is unparalleled in other well known Hellenistic Jewish authors (Termini, Le potenze di Dio, 27–34). The two powers (“creative” and “ruling”) precede all beings; they are not inherent in the world. Thus, it is a priority to consider the powers as God’s power to act (Cher. 24) (Wolfson, Philo, 220).

Their existence is indefinite (Sacr. 1.15,59), eternal (Spec. 1.8,47; Mos. 2.12,65) and infinite (Opif. 1.6,23) (Francesca Calabi, God’s Acting, Man’s Acting: Tradition and Philosophy in Philo of Alexandria, 98).

Aside from theo-cosmology, historicity is also important to Philo’s concept of power. It may be said that the interconnection of cosmology and historicity is peculiar to Philo, as can be observed in De Vita Mosis. The term δύναμις refers to the conflict between Egypt and Israel, which is clearly dominated by the divine δυνάμεις and the manifestation of divine power (Mos. 2.255). In the same work, however, δύναμις is also manifested in a non-conflict situation – that is, cult as a special occasion upon which the divine power itself explicitly enters the human world (2.76–140). Finally, let us focus upon the ambiguity of the relationship between power and the Logos. Here, Philo himself does not strictly distinguish between the two (David T. Runia, “The Beginnings of the End: Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology,” in Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath, eds. Dorothea Frede and André Laks, 296). With this reserva tion, we can say that the Logos has a certain character of power (Baudouin S. Decharneux, “Divine Powers in Philo of Alexandria’s De opificio mundi,” in Divine Powers in Late Antiquity, eds. Anna Marmodoro and Irini-Fotini Viltanioti, 127–139). Indeed, accord ing to QE 2.68, the powers spring from the Logos as if from a well. Even the ideas by which the world was created have a dynamic character (Mut. 21, 122; cf. Plato, Phaedr. 95e–101e; Soph. 247d–e) (Wolfson, Philo, 217). The main fact is that the Logos is superior to the δυνάμεις. The role of the Logos as the creator of the universe (Opif. 16–25; QE 2.68) follows the tradition of the world soul (cf. Plato, Phaedr. 245c–246a; Tim. 27c–37c.41d.e). In comparison with the creative power, the Logos is a rational agent, which incorporates the ideal world and has an ordering function (Opif. 20; according to 21 it also incorporates the world-creating power).

Identification of Being and the powers

Occasionally, Philo identifies δύναμις with the Being, discussing it in the singular (cf. Mos. 1.111; Spec. 1.66) and employing superla tive attributes that seem to admit of comparison: ἀνωτάτω καὶ μεγίστη δύναμις, “the highest and greatest power” (Mos. 1.111). Yet here too we must remember the Philonian principle that the Being cannot be measured. The divine power is what creates and governs the world (Mos. 2.99), as if God had externalized and differentiated his power into powers to get the world originating and happening. Philo is not specific regarding how exactly the Being is pos sessed of power (Wolfson, Philo, 223). In Cher. 19, Philo first speaks about immutable divine power and then about the Being as constituting the Logos and the two powers as separate entities (Cher. 20). He calls one of the two principal powers “God” while also speaking of God as “Agent and Father” (ποιητής καί πατήρ, Opif. 7), refer ring directly to Plato (cf. Tim. 28c3; in the reverse order cf. Opif. 10; 21).21 In Abr. 121, Philo terms the Being “Father of the universe” and the active power “God”, approximating the Being and the power but not equating them. The term “God” seems to refer to the way in which actions toward the world are ultimately based on the Being.

Given the infinite plurality of powers, the hyper-universality of power on the one hand and the particular powers immanent in the world on the other (e.g. life-power in water, Mos. 1.81, and in the fruit of palms, Mos. 1.189), we can say that the concept of δύναμις is characterized by an ideal (but not ontic) connec tion, ranging from God to the human heart, in which various psychic δυνάμεις operate (Leg. 1.11; 2.22–24; Opif. 117; Agr. 78).23 This connection is apparent only in a comprehensive bird’s-eye view of Philo’s work. Yet this comprehensive ness is congruent with Philo’s aforementioned attitudes. Without the concept of power, the Being would be reduced to a kind of deistic transcendence, some thing quite unthinkable to Philo, whereas taking the theo-cosmic power(s) into account means that we can think about worldwide divine presence (Post. 1.14: . . . πεπλήρωκε τὸν κόσμον ἑαυτοῦ διὰ γὰρ δυνάμεως “he filled the world with himself through power”) without making these powers immanent to the world. Yet the relationship between the two powers and the immanent powers is neither quite clear nor could it be, as they are not distinctive entities. However, it should be noted that in Philo’s world “everything moves”, i.e. the world is full of action, filled with living beings, pointing to the primordial cause which makes movement possible, but only in so far as it exists. In this sense we can understand Philo’s claim in Spec. 1.32–35, according to which created things can be regarded as proof of the Being as being, but not as proof of the Being’s essence (τὸ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, cf. Aristotle, Cat. 92.6).

Continuity with Greek and Hellenistic philosophy

Philo might have encountered δύναμις as a Greek-Hellenistic religious concept of a distinct entity (Hans Dieter Betz, “Dynamis,” in Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible, eds. Karel van der Toorn, Bob Becking, and Pieter W. van der Horst, 268), and even more likely as a subject of Stoic thought (Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, 19), steeped in natural philosophy. The cosmological meaning of power can be traced back to the Pythagoreans (Bonazzi, “Towards Transcendence,” 236). However, it was the Stoics who first understood power as the original cosmic principle (cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. 9.75 [SVF 2:112–113]), to which even the gods were subordinate (Betz, “Dynamis,” 269–270). Although Aristotle’s classical reflections on power with their ontological interest are not shared by Philo, a comparison with Aristotle’s concept of δύναμις can show partial concordances, such as in the outlined differentiation of the concept of power, albeit in a different way, the concept of δύναμις being the prin ciple of motion in the general sense (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως / κινητική) according to Book V of Metaphysics (Met. 1019a15a; 1049b9). However, Philo’s “power” is primarily hyper-cosmic and related to the real world only by its activity, not passivity (cf. also Plato, Soph. 247d–e), and is rather a dynamizing (see below), creative and ruling principle that can be better termed a principle of action (while it is some of the this-worldly δυνάμεις, especially of the psychic and personality kind, that have a character of dispositions).

For the universality and complexity of δύναμις, Philo could have found direct support in (Pseudo)Aristotle’s On the Universe (Περὶ Κόσμου), which recalls Thales’ thesis that “everything is full of gods” (fr. A 22 of Aristotle) and affirms it with respect to the divine power (δύναμις), but not to the divine essence (οὐσία, 6.397b16–20). Similarly, Philo distinguishes the unknowable Being from the divine power, which is subordinate to the Being. At the same time, however, he advocates the concept of a dynamic universe, a concept which found its first representative in Heraclitus’ teaching on “fire” (B 90) and “discord” (B 8; 80), and also surfaced in adaptations of the theory of the elements, such as those of Anaxagoras (DK 59 B 16, Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 179.8 and 155.21) and in On the Universe (5.396b29).

For the development from pre-Platonic to Platonic philosophy:

cf. Michel René Barnes, The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 21–93 and especially 83: “Plato’s reworking of the Presocratic understanding of δύναμις through the discovery of a purposefulness in production (whether that production is of the whole cosmos or just some small part of it) is the Platonic doctrine of produc tion and becomes normative for teleologies after his, as we see in Aristotle.”

1. How does Philo’s δύναμις relate to the Old Testament concept of power?

The scope of terminology ranges from divine power (to consider the Torah and the Psalms only: 8 × זֹע in Torah and 44 × in the Book of Psalms as a term for divine power, cf. e.g. 28:8 [27:8 LXX κραταίωμα]; 29:11 [28:11 LXX ἰσχύς]; 62:12 [61:13 LXX κράτος], etc.; 10 × לִי ַ ח in the Book of Psalms, cf. Psa 18:33.40 [17:33 LXX δύναμις]; 1 × ה ָ רוּבְגּ in Torah, in Deut 3:24 [LXX ἰσχύς] and 15 × in the Book of Psalms, cf. Psa 106:2 [105:2 LXX δυναστεία]; 4 × ֹ ַ ח כ ּ in the Book of Psalms, cf. Psa 65:7 [64:7 LXX ἰσχύς]) through the power manifested in the universe (cf. Isa 40:12), in nature (e.g. ה ָ רוּבְגּ / δυναστεία in Psa 147:10 [146:10 LXX]), as the life force (e.g. ֹ ַ ח 4:12), as physical strength (e.g. ֹ ַ ח כ ּ / ἰσχύς in Gen 31,6; overall 55 × כ ּ / ἰσχύς in Gen ֹ ַ ח כ ּ for physical strength in O.T.) (Krawelitzk, Gottes Macht im Psalter, 70), in epiphany (זֹע / δύναμις in Psa 63:3 [62:3 LXX]), in domination over people (טלשׁ Qal in Koh 2:19 [LXX ἐξουσιάζω]), in military events (e.g. לִי δύναμις in Psa 18:33.40 [17:33.40 LXX]), in notable individuals ( ֹ ַ ח ַ ח / כ ּ in Mic 3:8 [LXX ἰσχύς]) and in those who have experiencing or have gone through a life crisis (e.g., Psa 62:3–12 with זֹע in v. 12 [61:13 LXX κράτοϛ]). Power can have either a notably spiritual or a more materialized, physical character; it can become manifest in both ordinary and extraordinary phenomena. The association of power with God is very distinctive (Runia, “Clement of Alexandria,” 260), but in an obvious manner and without any theoretical insights.

God has proprietary power – always in relation to the world and man, e.g. to the creation and history (fixed plural תוֹרוּב ְגּ of ה ָ רוּב ְגּ “mighty deeds” Deut 3:24 a.o.) (Judith Krawelitzk, Gottes Macht im Psalter, 85), and also as the giver of the power/strength ( ֹ ַ ח כ ּ / ἰσχύς in Deut 8:18 a.o.). Humans live through the power of God (Krawelitzk, Gottes Macht im Psalter, 113). Thus, in one study of the Psalms, we read in relation to Psa 2: “Der theo logische Bedeutungsgehalt von ʿōz entspricht den verschiedenen Aspekten der Stärke und Macht Jahwes, die sich den Menschen und seinem Volke einerseits als überwältigend-majestätisch, andererseits als hilfreich-schützend erweist” (cf. זוֹע ָמ “refuge, stronghold” in Psa 27:1 a.o.) (Adam Simon van der Woude, “זזע,” in Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament, vol. 1, ed. Ernst Jenni, 254). Last but not least, it is also signif icant that the Old Testament expressions for power express and evoke respect and (holy) fear. However, the Greek version of the Old Testament transforms this semantic vastness.

Of all other terms for ruling authority, ἐξουσία is particularly noteworthy. It is not found in the Pentateuch but cf. 2 Kgs 20:30; Psa 113:2 [112:2 LXX]; 135:8.9 [134:8.9 LXX]; Ecc 8:8, where the equivalent to ה ָל ָשׁ ְמ ֶמ is “ruling power”; in Dan 4:27.31; 5:7.16.29; 6:4; 7:14 to ו כ ְל ַמ “kingdom, reign”, occurring mainly in the deu terocanonical literature (Jdt 1×; Tob 3×; 1 Macc 9×; 2 Macc 6×; Wis 2×; Sir 8×; Pss Sol 1×; Add Dan 9×; Bel 2×) as if it were a typical part of the lexicon of Alexandrian Jews. In the same sense, it is known to Philo (e.g. in Opif. 1.17; Leg. 1.95; 2.91) but he also uses it for the ruling power (Cher. 27; Sacr. 1.59; Abr. 129). Apparently, Philo has a good reason to associate power with δόξα “glory,” as the Hebrew equivalent of δόξα implies power (cf. דוֹבָכּ in Ex 24:17; Lev 9:23; Num 14:22; Deut 5:24) (Otto Kaiser, Der Gott des Alten Testaments: Theologie des Alten Testaments, vol. 3, Jahwes Gerechtigkeit, 191-198). In Spec. 1.45–48, he identifies it with God’s guarding powers (cf. also Fug. 1.15). In interpreting Moses’ prayer (Ex 33:18, cf. Spec. 1.45), he iden tifies the powers with the glory that surrounds the invisible God as powers which here also play the role of a bodyguard (δορυφορέω “to keep guard” in 1.45). In QE 2.45 and 47, the “glory” appears on Sinai. Wolfson was the first modern scholar to point out that the identification of glory and power must have been known to the Alexandrian Jews who sang Psalm 24, where God is called “King of Glory, Lord of Hosts”, in Septuagint ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς δόξης κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων (Psa 24:10 [23:10 LXX]) (Wolfson, Philo, 219).

Last but not least, we must consider the biblical personification of God’s word and its hidden meaning as interpreted by Philo. Behind the biblical picture of the messengers – the three men who came to Abraham according to Gen 18:2 (Abr. 107; cf. Deo 4) – Philo sees beings who catachretically represent the “Father of All,” who in the Scriptures is called by his proper name, “the Being”, and the two eldest (πρεσβύτατος) powers that are also closest to the Being, called “God” and “Lord” (Abr. 121). Similarly, in De Deo and the commentary on the book of Exodus (QE 2.68), he imagines the cherubim in the Tent of Meeting as per Ex 25:22 (Deo 5) and the seraphim in the Jerusalem temple from Isa 6:2 (Deo 6). In De Deo, he compares these three biblical loci. Thus, he provides a concise interpreta tion of traditional religious thought, wherein these Biblical figures personify the “superhuman” powers mediating between the transcendent world and humans.