Emil Schürer writes (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, pp. 329-331):
While this shorter explanation in a catechetical form [Questions and Answers on Genesis] was intended for more extensive circles, Philo’s special and chief scientific work is his large allegorical commentary on Genesis, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι (such is the title given it in Euseb. Hist. eccl. ii. 18. 1, and Photius, Bibliotheca cod. 103. Comp. also Origen, Comment. in Matth. vol. xvii. c. 17; contra Celsum, iv. 51). These two works frequently approximate each other as to their contents. For in the Quaestiones et solutiones also, the deeper allegorical significance is given as well as the literal meaning. In the great allegorical commentary on the contrary, the allegorical interpretation exclusively prevails. The deeper allegorical sense of the sacred letter is settled in extensive and prolix discussion, which by reason of the copious adducting of parallel passages often seems to wander from the text. Thus the entire exegetic method, with its draggin in of the most heterogeneous passages in elucidation of the idea supposed to exist in the text, forcibly recalls the method of Rabbinical Midrash. This allegorical interpretation however has with all its arbitrariness, its rules and laws, the allegorical meaning as once settled for certain persons, objects and events being afterwards adhered to with tolerable consistency. Especially is it a fundamental thought, from which the exposition is everywhere deduced, that the history of mankind as related in Genesis is in reality nothing else than a system of psychology and ethic. The different individuals, who here make their appearance, denote the different states of soul (τροποι της ψυχης) which occur among men. To analyse these in their variety and their relations both to each other and to the Deity and the world of sense, and thence to deduce moral doctrines, is the special aim of this great allegorical commentary. Thus we perceive at the same time, that Philo’s chief interest is not—as might from the whole plan of his system be supposed—speculative theology for its own sake, but on the contrary psychology and ethic. To judge from his ultimate purpose he is not a speculative theologian, but a psychologist and moralist (comp. note 183).
The commentary at first follows the text of Genesis verse by verse. Afterwards single sections are selected, and some of them so fully treated, as to grow into regular monographs. Thus e.g. Philo takes occasion from the history of Noah to write two books on drunkenness (περι μεθης), which he does with such thoroughness, that a collection of the opinions of other philosophers on this subject filled the first of these lost books (Mangey, i. 357).
The work, as we have it, begins at Gen. ii. 1; Και ετελεσθησαν οι ουρανοι και η γη. The creation of the world is therefore not treated of. For the composition, De opificio mundi, which precedes it in our editions, is a work of an entirely different character, being no allegorical commentary on the history of the creation, but a statement of that history itself. Nor does the first book of the Legum allegoriae by any means join on to the work De opificio mundi; for the former begins at Gen. ii. 1, while in De opif. mundi, the creation of man also, according to Gen. ii, is already dealt with. Hence—as Gfrörer rightly asserts in answer to Dähne—the allegorical commentary cannot be combined with De opif. mundi as though the two were but parts of the same work. At most may the question be raised, whether Philo did not also write an allegorical commentary on Gen. i. This is however improbable. For the allegorical commentary proposes to treat of the history of mankind, and this does not begin till Gen. ii. 1. Nor need the abrupt commencement of Leg. alleg. i seem strange, since this manner of starting at once with the text to be expounded, quite corresponds with the method of Rabbinical Midrash. The later books too of Philo’s own commentary begin in fact in the same abrupt manner. In our manuscripts and editions only the first books bear the title belonging to the whole work, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι. All the later books have special titles, a circumstance which gives the appearance of their being independent works. In truth however all that is contained in Mangey’s first vol.—viz. the works which here follow—belongs to the book in question (with the sole exception of De opificio mundi).
Emil Schürer comments:
“Περι γεωργιας. De agricultura (Mangey, i. 300-328). On Gen. ix. 20a.—Περι φυτουργιας Νωε το δευτερον. De plantatione Noe (Mangey, i. 329-356). On Gen. ix. 20b. The common title of these two books is properly περι γεωργιας. Comp. Euseb. H. E. ii. 18. 2: περι γεωργιας δυο. Hieronymus, De vir. illustr. 11: de agricultura duo. Euseb. Praep. Evang. vii. 13. 3 (ed. Gaisford): εν τω περι γεωργιας προτερω. Ibid. vii. 13. 4: εν τω δευτερω.” (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, p. 335)
J. H. A. Hart writes (The Jewish Quarterly Review Original Series 17, pp. 107-111):
The book On Noah’s Vine-dressing fulfils the promise made at the end of “the former book,” On Noah’s Husbandry. Philo turns from the general to the particular, from the genus to the species, and takes up the greater part of this sequel with preliminary discussions. Noah’s vine-planting, a species of husbandry, is not reached till § 139, where the previous sections are described as dealing with (1) the oldest and most holy husbandry which God (το αιτιον) employs in relation to the world; (2) that of the good man; (3) the ramifications of the number four.
The greatest of planters (φυτουργων} and the most perfect in his art is the Lord of the universe; and the plant which contains in itself the individual plants is this world, whose sure prop is the eternal Word of the everlasting God. Of these plants some possess motion (and these we call animals), some do not. Each and all have their own order and their own sphere. Greatest of all is man, whose eyes alone are so placed that he can behold the heaven; so that he is, as the old saw says, not an earthly but a heavenly plant. By some our mind is said to be a part of the aetherial nature, but Moses cannot compare the rational soul to any other created thing, only to the Creator himself. As our bodily eyes can run up to the far-off heaven, so the eyes of the soul pass the boundaries of the whole universe and press on to the Uncreated. For this reason they that pass their lives never satiated with wisdom and understanding, are said in the oracles to be “called up”; for it is right that they should be called upwards to the Divine who have been inspired by him (cf. Gen. ii. 7). And as with the great so is it with the little world—man. In him God plants trees, his members and the faculties of body and mind.
The planting of Paradise is consonant with what has been said. The story obviously cannot be taken literally. To take one point only—for whose benefit is the garden planted? Not for God’s benefit, for the Cause cannot be contained in that which is caused. Nor for man’s, since no man is introduced into it at first. So, then, we must have recourse to allegory, which is dear to men capable of seeing. Indeed, the oracles clearly offer suggestions pointing thereto. The trees of life, knowledge, and so forth, are of no earthly growth, but must be virtues and virtuous actions, plants of the rational soul which revels in God alone. No beasts are introduced into Paradise, as into the Ark: the Ark is the symbol of the body, Paradise of the virtues which welcome nothing untamed or irrational. The man who enters is not he who was fashioned after the image, but he who was created; for the other, the ideal man, does not differ from the tree which bears immortal life. And the man, or mind, proves earthly and is banished. Wherefore Moses, in pity, prays that the clear-sighted may be restored (Ex. xv. 17 f.) to the hill of God’s inheritance, whether that be the universe in which they may live in accordance with nature, the summum bonum which they may use and enjoy, or the company of wise souls (Deut. xxxii. 7-9), who are united by virtue, while the children of earth—the sons of Adam—are scattered. Indeed, not only are such souls the portion of God, but God is also—so Moses dares to say—their portion (Deut. x. 9; Num. xviii. 20), the inheritance of the mind which is perfectly purged and, renouncing (απογινωσκων) all created things, knows only the One Uncreated, to whom it has come, by whom it has also been received (υφ ου και προσειληπται). Such, Levites indeed, are like the ancient philosopher who looked on a gorgeous procession and said, “See how many things there are which I do not need”—so was he enamoured of the beauty of wisdom. It is true that some who counterfeit (των επιμορφαζοντων) piety say that such a claim is neither holy nor safe, but this is due to their ignorance. Levites possess God just as a painter the art of painting; the possessor is not the master but the beneficiary of his possession.
Abraham is the next planter (Gen. xxi. 33), and with his “field” must be connected the well in which no water was found (Gen. xxvi. 32 f.). The well symbolizes the search after wisdom which is never satisfied: so one of the ancients (Socrates) said that his wisdom consisted in the fact that he alone knew that he knew nothing. The “name of the Lord God everlasting” (Gen. xxi. 33) refers to the two Powers of God, sovereign and beneficent respectively, as in Jacob’s prayer (Gen. xxviii. 21).
But not only the wise, but we also who are not yet perfected, are commanded by the Law to learn agriculture (Lev. xix. 23-25), and to prune or purge our trees. For example, sacrificial worship is a goodly plant, but its offshoot is superstition. Piety does not, as some suppose, consist in the sacrifice itself apart from the mind of the worshipper. God’s court of justice is not to be bribed. The guilty, though they offer a hundred oxen every day, are rejected; the innocent, though they make no offering, are accepted. The reference to the purging of the fruit is obviously allegorical, and the mention of the fourth year depends, as in the account of the Creation (Gen. i. 14), upon the mystical significance of the number four. The duty of thanksgiving here inculcated is to be discharged, not by offerings but by hymns, and those not vocal but mental. To illustrate this, Philo quotes the myth of Mnemosyne as an “old story discovered by wise men, handed down by memory from one generation to another, which has not escaped our ears ever greedy of instruction.” The story is that when the Creator had completed the universe he asked one of his underlings (υποφητων) if any thing were lacking. He answered, only speech to praise it all. The All-Father praised the answer, and soon there sprang up the race of musicians and singers from one of his Powers, a maiden Mneme (memory) or Mnemosyne. Accordingly, we say that as the peculiar work of God is beneficence so that of his creation is thanksgiving. This let us practise in poems and encomia, that the Creator and the world may both be honoured—”the one (as some one said) the best of Causes, the other the most perfect of created things.”
Returning to the text (Gen. ix. 20f.), it is obviously necessary to discuss intoxication (μεθη) and the favourite problem of the philosophers, “Should the wise man be intoxicated.” Now there are two intoxications, one the being drunk with wine (οινουσθαι), the other the raving in wine (ληρειν εν οινω). Of those who have handled the question some say that the wise man should not be intoxicated in either sense; others that the first kind befitted and the second did not befit the good man. The arguments which support the latter position start from a consideration of homonyms and synonyms, the first being words each denoting a number of objects, the second groups of words each denoting the same object. Well, then, μεθυ is merely an ancient poetical synonym of οινος; therefore to be intoxicated is nothing more than to be drunk with wine; therefore the wise man will, like Noah, be intoxicated. Again, the enjoyment and use of wine in ancient times was far different from what we see to-day. The men of old first prayed, offered sacrifice, cleansed body and soul, and then joyfully held their revels in the temples where they had worshipped. Hence, some suppose the word μεθυειν to be derived from μετα θυειν, “after sacrifice.” A third argument is likewise based upon (a different) etymology, which explains the word as the equivalent of μεθεσις, i.e. “relaxation” of soul. And truly, wisdom is not austere and downcast, but joyful. According to the divine Moses its end is sport and laughter; so Laughter (Isaac) sports with Patience (Rebecca), and is seen by no vulgar eye but only the king’s (Gen. xxvi. 8). So wine, like wealth and fame, makes the good better, the evil worse, and the good man will be intoxicated without losing aught of his virtue.
If, as in a law court, we must employ not merely technical pleas but points of substance—the evidence of witnesses, for example—we will put forward many well-reputed sons of physicians and philosophers who in speech and in their writings plainly regard intoxication as being simply drunk with wine—which is no bad thing for a wise man in season, if he carry it not so far that he cannot keep a secret.
So far, then, Philo agrees with the Stoics in the matter, but reserves for the next treatise the teaching of Moses. The end of the tract is surely unique in a sermon (if such it be), for he calls upon those who hold the opposite view to state their case that judgment may not go by default. “No one,” he says, “contending by himself is proclaimed victor, but if he so contend he will appear to be fighting shadows.”
F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker write (Philo, vol. 3, pp. 207-211):
The first part of this treatise, extending to the end of § 139; treats firstly of God’s planting and then of man learning to copy His work. The second part (§ 140 onwards) should be entitled Περι μεθης, for it deals with the vine only with respect to its fruit. The title of the treatise is, therefore, inappropriate.
A. 1-139
(a) 1-72. The first Planter and His plant.
(1) 1-27. The universe and its component parts planted.
(2) 28-31. Trees planted in man, the microcosm.
(3) 32-46. The names of the two trees in Eden point to an allegorical interpretation. “Eden” is “delight” in the Lord. “Eastward” is “in the light.” “The tree of Life” is the man of Gen. i. 27 in the image of God. The earthly man of Gen. ii. is placed in Paradise to be tested amid the virtues, the plants of a rational soul.
(4) 47 ff. That Israel, God’s special inheritance, may be planted in Eden is Moses’ prayer.
(5) 62-72. God the Portion of Inheritance of Levi and of those who have the Levite mind.
(b) Lessons learned from the First Planter, and copies of His planting (73-139).
(1) 74-93. Abraham’s planting (Gen. xxi. 33). The tree the “hide” of 10,000 cubits; the place the well, which is without water (Gen. xxvi. 32 LXX), and so symbolic of the fruitless search for knowledge, and of the discovery of our own ignorance; the fruit the invocation of the Name “Eternal God,” which connotes “Benefactor,” whereas “Lord” connotes “Master.”
(2) 94-139. Our planting (Lev. xix. 23-25). Ere we can plant fruit trees we must migrate to the God-given land, i.e. the mind must find the way of Wisdom. The beginner bidden to prune, i.e. cut out all hurtful things, e.g. the harlot and the toady from Friendship, superstition from Religion. Jacob’s peeled rods and the leper’s flesh, both white all over, serve as a pattern. Philo attempts to explain the command to prune the fruit itself.
The fourth year, in which the fruit is “holy for praise to the Lord” leads to a discourse on the number 4, on praise as the fruit of education, on thanksgiving as creation’s chief duty, illustrated by the story of the birth of Mnemosyne. As the fifth year is ours for food, after the fourth year of thanksgiving, so “Issachar” or “Reward” was born next after “Judah” or “Praise.”
B. 140-177
We now pass on to the vine-culture of Noah. As the vine is the means of Drunkenness (and the just man made himself drunk with it), we have to consider the subject of drunkenness. Moses’ views will be given later (in De Ebrietate). Let us now examine what the philosophical schools say about it. They put the question thus, “Will the wise man get drunk?” (139-141). But before stating the arguments on either side, we note that the term “get drunk” (μεθυειν) may be used for hard drinking (οινουσθαι) simply, or for drinking carried to the point of foolish behaviour (ληρειν). All condemn the latter, but one school holds that if μεθυειν is used in the less offensive sense, the wise man may freely indulge in it; another, “that he cannot safely do so, and will therefore avoid all carousals, unless social duties necessitate his participation in them.”
The arguments of the thesis: “The wise man will get drunk” are now stated.
(1) As μεθυ and οινος are admittedly synonyms, their derivatives μεθυειν and οινουσθαι must be synonyms also. (This is preceded by a disquisition on “homonyms” and “synonyms.”) (§§ 149-155.)
(2) μεθυειν is properly μετα το θυειν, (“after sacrificing”), and the ancient and right use of wine was orderly and religious in marked contrast to present custom. If μεθυειν is used in this sense, it is suitable to the wise man (§§ 156-164).
(3) Another derivation of μεθυειν is from μεθεσις (relaxation), and the blessings of relaxation and cheerfulness are pointed out.
(4) A dialectical argument, that, as soberness is found in the fool as well as in the wise man, its opposite, drunkenness, is common to both (§ 172).
(5) An argument from the use of the term μεθη in various writers, showing that they identified μεθυειν with οινουσθαι, and did not associate it with ληρος (§§ 173 f.).
At this point the disputant professes to meet the arguments of the other side. The first of these is the argument of Zeno, that, since no man could trust the drunken man with a secret, drunkenness is unsuitable to the wise man. This is refuted (§§ 175-177). The rest of the disquisition is lost.
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