Challenge to Asymmetry Antinatalism Argument (Prof. Yoshizawa)

Article

1. Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
2. As the basis of the argument, Benatar asserts the following “axiological asymmetry” between harms and benefits (Benatar and Wasserman 2015, 23) (Benatar 2006, 30. The term “axiological asymmetry” is from Benatar and Wasserman 2015, 21. This asymmetry is also called “basic asymmetry” elsewhere; see Benatar 2013, 123):
3. Asymmetry between harms and benefits:
4. In addition to (i), according to Benatar the following three asymmetries are also explained by the axiological asymmetry:
5. Benatar’s explanations for the other three would be as follows: A benefit with “good,” as in (2), does not provide a positive reason to procreate because its absence (4) is “not bad” rather than “bad” (the first half of (ii)). The absence of benefit—“not bad” of (4)—does not make regret—a kind of negative attitude—for failing to create happy people appropriate (the second half of (iii)) and does not make sadness—a kind of negative feeling—for the unborn happy people appropriate (the second half of (iv)). In contrast, a harm with the negative evaluation of “bad,” as in (1), provides a negative reason not to create people (the second half of (ii)). It also makes regret for the sake of the people who are brought into existence appropriate (the first half of (iii)) and sadness for distant people who suffer appropriate (the first half of (iv)). In summary, according to Benatar, the axiological asymmetry is supported by the explanatory power of four asymmetries and results in the mid-conclusion that coming into existence is always a harm. Based on this, Benatar derives the anti-natalist conclusion.9 This is the framework of the asymmetry argument.
6. Gap in Benatar’s Argument
7. Some claim that (all or some of) the four asymmetries are explained by principles other than the axiological asymmetry (Harman 2009, 781; Bayne 2010, 50–52; Metz 2011, 241–243), and some claim that the asymmetry of procreational duties is problematic (Bradley 2013) and that comparative evaluations based on the axiological asymmetry are incoherent (Bradley 2010). By contrast, I argue that the anti-natalist conclusion fails even if we accept all the explicit assumptions of Benatar’s argument.
8. The Gap: Look at the two pairs of expressions emphasized in this passage: one is the pair “suffering would be bad” and “pleasure would be good”; the other is “a duty not to bring suffering people into existence” and “no duty to bring happy people into existence.” The former pair is axiological evaluations of parts of life. However, the latter pair is moral duties concerning life as a whole. How the evaluation of parts of life is relevant to the evaluation of life as a whole is not stated here, although the lives of suffering and happy people may encompass both painful and pleasurable parts. The same can be said of the other three asymmetries. While all of them concern life as a whole, the axiological asymmetry that is alleged to explain them is applied to parts of life, such as pains and pleasures. Recall the three pairs of expressions, that is, (ii) “that child will thereby be benefited” and “that child will suffer,” (iii) “suffering child” and “happy child,” and (iv) “distant people who suffer” and “happy people.” The point is that in the process of Benatar’s explanation of the four asymmetries, the axiological asymmetry indicates how to evaluate parts of life. However, he does not explain how to evaluate life as a whole. This is the gap I find in his argument.
9. First Horn: Asymmetrical Comparison First: This is not the broadly accepted asymmetry of procreational duties, according to which we simply have no duty to bring happy lives into existence. Rather, this is nothing other than the anti-natalist conclusion. This result is not surprising because if the harmful birth conclusion is correct, the moral evaluations based on it should be anti-natalist, as Benatar claims. Let us see how the explanations of other asymmetries would go. (ii) The prospective beneficence asymmetry would be as follows: The second half is explained; it is natural—it is not strange—to cite as a reason for not having a child the fact that the child will thereby suffer because she will also be comparatively harmed. However, the first half is not explained; it is certainly strange to cite as a reason for having a child the fact that the child will thereby be benefitted, but it is rather natural—it is not strange—to cite the fact as a reason for not having a child because she will be comparatively harmed.10 In other words, because all life is comparatively harmful regardless of whether it is noncomparatively harmful or beneficial, it always provides a reason not to procreate. This is clearly not the widely shared understanding of (ii).
10. Next, (iii) the retrospective beneficence asymmetry would be as follows: when one has brought a suffering child into existence, it makes sense to regret having brought that child into existence and to regret it for the sake of that child because she is comparatively harmed; by contrast, when one fails to bring a happy child into existence, one cannot regret that failure for the sake of the person but rather should feel at ease about that failure because she would be comparatively harmed. This is clearly not our commonsensical attitude. Finally, (iv) the asymmetry of distant suffering and absent happy people would be as follows: we are rightly sad for distant people who suffer because they are comparatively harmed; by contrast, we need not shed any tears for absent happy people on uninhabited planets or uninhabited islands or other regions on our own planet, butrather we may feel pleased at their absence because they would be comparatively harmed. This is clearly not common sense.
11. Second Horn: As-a-Whole Evaluation First: In contrast, the second way to evaluate life as a whole is by first making a non-comparative evaluation of it. The asymmetrical comparisons are conducted afterward. Several standards may work for obtaining an evaluation of a whole life. The simplest way is to think that the value is determined by the sum of the values of the beneficial and harmful parts of life; however, Benatar (2006, 45) opposes a simple calculation of this kind.11 In fact, reflecting on the nature of the explanation of our common sense, no strict method of calculation seems necessary. Moreover, even assigning numbers to the values of each whole life is not necessary. To understand this point, let us consider the question, “How do most people think about the morality of bringing a miserable and a happy life into existence?” A commonsense answer is, “We have a moral duty to avoid bringing a miserable life into existence, and we have no duty to bring happy people into existence.” This answer is the asymmetry of procreational duties. Moreover, the question that the axiological asymmetry is supposed to answer is, “Why do we so think of our duties about bringing miserable and happy lives into existence?” In considering these questions, the point is to ensure that we are not required to explain the conceptions of a miserable and a happy life themselves in the answers. Additionally, we can easily have a conception of how well or ill a whole life goes even if it is a rough one.
12. This is part of the reason that most of us feel surprised to hear that our life is always (comparatively) harmful—or non-comparatively worse (based on the quality-of-life argument in Benatar 2006, Chapter 3)—than we thought. 12 At any rate, our ordinary conception of our lives is that there are both miserable and happy lives. Based on this, the explanation of (i) by virtue of the axiological asymmetry would be as follows: First, recall that the axiological asymmetry is proposed not just as the asymmetry between pains and pleasures but also as the general asymmetry of values for a person that can be applied to other kinds of harms and benefits. It can be applied to life as a whole. Indeed, in his response to David Spurrett’s criticism, Benatar (2012, 131–132) admits that a valueless and a valuable life are also examples of harms and benefits, respectively.13 Figure 2 shows the results of replacing “harm” in Fig. 1 with “miserable life” and “benefit” with “happy life.”
13. Asymmetry between miserable and happy lives:
14. The difference between Benatar’s way of axiological evaluation and the alternative of first evaluating life as a whole lies only in the order of the evaluation steps. As described above, Benatar uses the order of “asymmetrical comparison first and as-a-whole evaluation second” to derive the harmful birth conclusion. Conversely, I use the order of “as-a-whole evaluation first and asymmetrical comparison second.” Nothing special is added. As we saw in Section 3.1, where I pointed out the gap, the evaluation of life as a whole is at any rate needed somewhere in the evaluation steps by the end of the explanation. The difference is only that in my alternative, before conducting the asymmetrical comparisons, X’s life is evaluated as a whole. After that, by comparing (1) with (3) and (2) with (4), while X’s life is evaluated as harmful (disadvantageous over its absence) when it is bad as a whole, X’s life is evaluated as non-beneficial (nonadvantageous over its absence) when it is good as a whole. This way of using the axiological asymmetry does not result in the harmful birth conclusion and the anti-natalist conclusion because it can be claimed that, while we have a duty not to create a disadvantageous life, we have no duty either to create or not to create a non-advantageous life. This is the second horn of the dilemma.
15. Summarizing the Dilemma: The dilemma arising from Benatar’s asymmetry argument can be summarized as follows. Two ways are available to obtain the value as a whole to bridge the gap of the argument: the evaluation of life as a whole is made either after or before the comparison based on the axiological asymmetry. On the one hand, if it is made after, Benatar’s harmful birth conclusion that coming into existence is always a harm is drawn from the axiological asymmetry because even if there are many beneficial parts in life that are not advantageous over their absence, only disadvantageous harmful parts are considered in the evaluation of life as a whole. However, the axiological asymmetry is not supported because it cannot explain our prevalent four asymmetries. On the other hand, if it is made before, the axiological asymmetry is supported because the four asymmetries are explained. However, the harmful birth conclusion is not derived. By applying the axiological asymmetry to life as a whole, both harmful and beneficial parts are considered in the non-comparative whole-life evaluation; thus, both harmful (disadvantageous) and nonbeneficial (non-advantageous) lives are evaluated in comparison to the absence of lives. In summary, it is not the order of “as-a-whole evaluation first and asymmetrical comparison second” but of “asymmetrical comparison first and as-a-whole evaluation second” that is needed to reach the anti-natalist conclusion. However, the latter is not supported, whereas the former is.