Emil Schürer writes (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, pp. 329-331):
While this shorter explanation in a catechetical form [Questions and Answers on Genesis] was intended for more extensive circles, Philo’s special and chief scientific work is his large allegorical commentary on Genesis, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι (such is the title given it in Euseb. Hist. eccl. ii. 18. 1, and Photius, Bibliotheca cod. 103. Comp. also Origen, Comment. in Matth. vol. xvii. c. 17; contra Celsum, iv. 51). These two works frequently approximate each other as to their contents. For in the Quaestiones et solutiones also, the deeper allegorical significance is given as well as the literal meaning. In the great allegorical commentary on the contrary, the allegorical interpretation exclusively prevails. The deeper allegorical sense of the sacred letter is settled in extensive and prolix discussion, which by reason of the copious adducting of parallel passages often seems to wander from the text. Thus the entire exegetic method, with its draggin in of the most heterogeneous passages in elucidation of the idea supposed to exist in the text, forcibly recalls the method of Rabbinical Midrash. This allegorical interpretation however has with all its arbitrariness, its rules and laws, the allegorical meaning as once settled for certain persons, objects and events being afterwards adhered to with tolerable consistency. Especially is it a fundamental thought, from which the exposition is everywhere deduced, that the history of mankind as related in Genesis is in reality nothing else than a system of psychology and ethic. The different individuals, who here make their appearance, denote the different states of soul (τροποι της ψυχης) which occur among men. To analyse these in their variety and their relations both to each other and to the Deity and the world of sense, and thence to deduce moral doctrines, is the special aim of this great allegorical commentary. Thus we perceive at the same time, that Philo’s chief interest is not—as might from the whole plan of his system be supposed—speculative theology for its own sake, but on the contrary psychology and ethic. To judge from his ultimate purpose he is not a speculative theologian, but a psychologist and moralist (comp. note 183).
The commentary at first follows the text of Genesis verse by verse. Afterwards single sections are selected, and some of them so fully treated, as to grow into regular monographs. Thus e.g. Philo takes occasion from the history of Noah to write two books on drunkenness (περι μεθης), which he does with such thoroughness, that a collection of the opinions of other philosophers on this subject filled the first of these lost books (Mangey, i. 357).
The work, as we have it, begins at Gen. ii. 1; Και ετελεσθησαν οι ουρανοι και η γη. The creation of the world is therefore not treated of. For the composition, De opificio mundi, which precedes it in our editions, is a work of an entirely different character, being no allegorical commentary on the history of the creation, but a statement of that history itself. Nor does the first book of the Legum allegoriae by any means join on to the work De opificio mundi; for the former begins at Gen. ii. 1, while in De opif. mundi, the creation of man also, according to Gen. ii, is already dealt with. Hence—as Gfrörer rightly asserts in answer to Dähne—the allegorical commentary cannot be combined with De opif. mundi as though the two were but parts of the same work. At most may the question be raised, whether Philo did not also write an allegorical commentary on Gen. i. This is however improbable. For the allegorical commentary proposes to treat of the history of mankind, and this does not begin till Gen. ii. 1. Nor need the abrupt commencement of Leg. alleg. i seem strange, since this manner of starting at once with the text to be expounded, quite corresponds with the method of Rabbinical Midrash. The later books too of Philo’s own commentary begin in fact in the same abrupt manner. In our manuscripts and editions only the first books bear the title belonging to the whole work, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι. All the later books have special titles, a circumstance which gives the appearance of their being independent works. In truth however all that is contained in Mangey’s first vol.—viz. the works which here follow—belongs to the book in question (with the sole exception of De opificio mundi).
Emil Schürer comments:
“Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι πρωται των μετα την εξαημερον. Legum allegoriarum liber i. (Mangey, i. 43-65). On Gen. ii. 1-17.—Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι δευτεραι των μετα την εξαημερον. Legum allegoriarum liber ii. (Mangey, i. 66-86). On Gen. ii. 18-iii. 1a.—Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι τριται των μετα την εξαημερον. Legum allegoriarum liber iii. (Mangey, i. 87-137). On Gen. iii. 8b-19.—The titles here given of the first three books, as customary in the editions since Mangey, require an important correction. Even the different extent of Books i. and ii. leads us to conjecture, that they may properly be but one book. In fact Mangey remarks at the commencement of the third book (i. 87, note): in omnibus codicibus opusculum hoc inscribitur αλληγορια δευτερα. Thus we have in fact but two books. There is however a gap between the two, the commentary on Gen. iii. 1b-8a being absent. The commentary too on Gen. iii. 20-23 is wanting, for the following book begins with Gen. iii. 24. As Philo in these first books follows the text step by step, it must be assumed, that each of the two pieces was worked up into a book by itself, and this is even certain with respect to the second. Hence the original condition was very probably as follows: Book i. on Gen. ii. 1-3, 1a, Book ii. on Gen. iii. 1b-3, 8a, Book iii. on Gen. iii. 8b-19, Book iv. on Gen. iii. 20-23. With this coincides the fact, that in the so-called Johannes Monachus ineditus, the commentary on Gen. iii. 8b-19 is indeed more often quoted as το γ της των νομων ιερων αλληγοριας (Mangey, i. 87, note). When on the other hand the same book is entitled as showing that the actual second book was already missing in the archetype of these manuscripts.” (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, pp. 331-332)
F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker write (Philo, vol. 1, pp. 140-145):
In 1-18 Philo deals with Gen. ii. 1-3, which tells first of the completion of Heaven and Earth. He takes these to mean the originals of Mind and Sense-perception, and bases on the Greek version a contrast between the numbers 6 and 7, making the former represent things earthly, and the latter things heavenly.
In Gen. ii. 2 he finds the origin of Mind and Sense-perception ascribed first to a Book and then to a Day, both Book and Day signifying the Mind or Reason of God. (19-21.)
In the repetition of the word “field” in Gen. ii. 5, he sees two fields yielding, respectively, what is intellectually and what is sensibly perceptible: in the rain the power given to the senses of apprehending objects presented to them, a power not needed when material objects did not exist, and in whose absence the Mind is without employment. (22-27.)
Gen. ii. 6 tells how Mind, the “spring,” waters the senses, “the face of the earth,” and shows the interdependence of Mind, Sense-perception, and object of sense, and the dependence of Mind on God; as well as the superiority of the living creature in being able to take in and go out to external object. (28-30.)
Going on to Gen. ii. 7, he contrasts the earthy man, moulded of clay by the Divine Artificer, with the heavenly Man, stamped with the image of God, and dwells on the change wrought in the former by the inbreathing of Life. He then answers four questions.
To the question why the Divine Breath is given, not to the heavenly, but to the earthy Man, he answers (a) that God loves to give, even to the imperfect; (b) that the inbreathing is on a par with the enjoining of a “positive” duty, which is a duty only because it is enjoined.
To the question as to the meaning of “inbreathed” he answers that it is a pregnant term for “inspired,” and that its aim is to enable us to conceive of God.
To the question why the inbreathing is “into the face,” he answers (a) that the face is the part where the senses are chiefly situated; (b) that the face represents the mind, which acts as God’s deputy in inspiring organs and senses. Such was Moses to Pharaoh. He is thus led to speak of God’s use of agents. Lastly, he says that πνοη intimates a less powerful gift than would have been intimated by πνευμα. (31-42.)
We now come to Gen. ii. 8. God planting a Garden shows earthly wisdom to be a copy of heavenly wisdom, for it means God causing excellence to strike root on earth. The “Garden” is Virtue. “Eden” tells of its luxuriant yield of happiness. It is “toward the sunrising,” for right reason or virtue ever rises to dispel darkness. Man is placed in the Garden “to tend it,” i.e. to give his whole mind to virtue.
God planting does not justify man in planting a grove by the altar, which is forbidden in Deut. xvi. 21, for (a) man cannot, like God, plant virtues in the soul; (b) a grove contains some wild trees; (c) what is prohibited is planting “to ourselves” (cf. 2nd Commandment).
It is somewhat startling to be told that the Man placed in the Garden in Gen. ii. 15 is not the Man of Gen. ii. 8, but the Man of Gen. i. 27. Only the latter can till and guard the virtues. The former sees them only to be driven from them. The one is “made,” the other is “moulded.” The Man of ii. 8 has but facility in apprehending (as is signified by the words “placed in the Garden”). The Man of ii. 15 has also persistence in doing (“to till it”), and tenacity in keeping (“to guard it”). (43-55.)
Gen. ii. 9 tells of the Trees, which are particular virtues, and their activities. Theoretical virtue is denoted by “fair to behold”; practical virtue by “good for food.” The Tree of Life is goodness, virtue, not (as physicians might suppose) the heart. It is “in the midst of the Garden.” Where “the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil” is, we are not told. Actually it is in the Garden, virtually outside it, for our dominant part is actually in God’s Garden through receiving the impress of goodness, virtually outside by receiving that of wickedness. Just so, my body can be here, my mind elsewhere. (56-62.)
The theme of Gen. ii. 10-14 is the Rivers. The four Rivers are the particular Virtues, effluxes of generic Virtue, the River that issues from “Eden,” which is the Wisdom or Reason of God. “Heads” implies the sovereignty of the Virtues: “separated”; their limited, defining, action. “Pheison” is Prudence, God’s fairest treasure, gleaming like gold, and encircling “Evilat” or Graciousness. “Geon” is Courage, beleaguering Ethiopia, which is Lowness or Cowardice. “Tigris” is Self-mastery, set against “Assyria,” the directing force claimed by Desire. Prudence, Courage, and Self-mastery occupy places in the soul corresponding to their spheres of action in the body, head, breast, and abdomen, the seats of Reason, High Spirit, and Lust. “Euphrates” (= fruitfulness) is Justice, or the harmony of the three parts of the soul.
We are then shown another way of reaching the same truth about the four Rivers. “Pheison” signifies “change of mouth,” i.e. transformation of speech into action, the true sign of Prudence. “Evilat” signifies “in travail,” as Folly in its futility always is. (63-76.)
The next eight sections (Gen. ii. 12) are a Note on the Gold and Precious Stones. Prudence, the gold, is still God’s, Philo taking “where” (ου) as “whose”. “The gold of that land” is universal, as distinguished from particular, Prudence, and to it belongs the epithet “good.” The “ruby” and the “emerald” represent respectively having and exercising good sense. Or the two stones are, perhaps, Judah and Issachar, representing, the one, thankfulness, the other, noble deeds. So in the High-priestly robes, the ruby must, from its position, have borne the name of Judah, and the sapphire that of Issachar. “Stone” is not added after “ruby,” because praise and thanksgiving lift a man out of himself and all that is of earth. Red befits Judah, green Issachar. (77-84.)
Now comes a short Note on Compassing (Gen. ii. 11 and 13). “Pheison” and “Geon” are said to “compass” countiies, for Prudence and Courage enclose and capture Folly and Cowardice. “Tigris” is said to be “over against the Assyrians,” for Self-mastery can but face and fight Pleasure. “Euphrates,” or Justice, neither encircles nor withstands but makes awards. (85-87).
In 88 f. we see the heavenly Man, the Man whom God had “made” not “moulded,” placed in the garden. This pure and less material Mind is set amid the Virtues (“plants”) to practise (“till”) and remember (“guard”) them.
The remainder of the treatise deals with the injunction to “Adam” in Gen. ii. 16 ff.
Since “Adam,” a name not self-imposed, signifies “earth,” probably the “moulded, earthy man” is meant. Moreover the heavenly Man needs no injunction to till and guard; still less does he need prohibition or exhortation.
The commana is given by “the Lord God.” Obedience to the “Lord” or ‘Master’ prepares us for boons from “God” the ‘Benefactor.’ So in Gen. iii. 23 punishment is inflicted by “the Lord God” in kind severity.
“Every tree” signifies all virtues. The addition of “feedingly” to “eat” signifies spiritual mastication. Eating represents perfunctory obedience: “feeding on,” thoughtful, hearty obedience.
Anent the position of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, illustrations of actual and virtual presence are given in 100.
The fact that the prohibition is addressed to more than one is explained by saying that (a) inferior men are very numerous; (b) the inferior man devoid of concentration is not a unity.
The treatise ends with the drawing of a distinction between the death which all die and the death of the soul.
Leave a Reply