Emil Schürer writes (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, pp. 329-331):
While this shorter explanation in a catechetical form [Questions and Answers on Genesis] was intended for more extensive circles, Philo’s special and chief scientific work is his large allegorical commentary on Genesis, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι (such is the title given it in Euseb. Hist. eccl. ii. 18. 1, and Photius, Bibliotheca cod. 103. Comp. also Origen, Comment. in Matth. vol. xvii. c. 17; contra Celsum, iv. 51). These two works frequently approximate each other as to their contents. For in the Quaestiones et solutiones also, the deeper allegorical significance is given as well as the literal meaning. In the great allegorical commentary on the contrary, the allegorical interpretation exclusively prevails. The deeper allegorical sense of the sacred letter is settled in extensive and prolix discussion, which by reason of the copious adducting of parallel passages often seems to wander from the text. Thus the entire exegetic method, with its draggin in of the most heterogeneous passages in elucidation of the idea supposed to exist in the text, forcibly recalls the method of Rabbinical Midrash. This allegorical interpretation however has with all its arbitrariness, its rules and laws, the allegorical meaning as once settled for certain persons, objects and events being afterwards adhered to with tolerable consistency. Especially is it a fundamental thought, from which the exposition is everywhere deduced, that the history of mankind as related in Genesis is in reality nothing else than a system of psychology and ethic. The different individuals, who here make their appearance, denote the different states of soul (τροποι της ψυχης) which occur among men. To analyse these in their variety and their relations both to each other and to the Deity and the world of sense, and thence to deduce moral doctrines, is the special aim of this great allegorical commentary. Thus we perceive at the same time, that Philo’s chief interest is not—as might from the whole plan of his system be supposed—speculative theology for its own sake, but on the contrary psychology and ethic. To judge from his ultimate purpose he is not a speculative theologian, but a psychologist and moralist (comp. note 183).
The commentary at first follows the text of Genesis verse by verse. Afterwards single sections are selected, and some of them so fully treated, as to grow into regular monographs. Thus e.g. Philo takes occasion from the history of Noah to write two books on drunkenness (περι μεθης), which he does with such thoroughness, that a collection of the opinions of other philosophers on this subject filled the first of these lost books (Mangey, i. 357).
The work, as we have it, begins at Gen. ii. 1; Και ετελεσθησαν οι ουρανοι και η γη. The creation of the world is therefore not treated of. For the composition, De opificio mundi, which precedes it in our editions, is a work of an entirely different character, being no allegorical commentary on the history of the creation, but a statement of that history itself. Nor does the first book of the Legum allegoriae by any means join on to the work De opificio mundi; for the former begins at Gen. ii. 1, while in De opif. mundi, the creation of man also, according to Gen. ii, is already dealt with. Hence—as Gfrörer rightly asserts in answer to Dähne—the allegorical commentary cannot be combined with De opif. mundi as though the two were but parts of the same work. At most may the question be raised, whether Philo did not also write an allegorical commentary on Gen. i. This is however improbable. For the allegorical commentary proposes to treat of the history of mankind, and this does not begin till Gen. ii. 1. Nor need the abrupt commencement of Leg. alleg. i seem strange, since this manner of starting at once with the text to be expounded, quite corresponds with the method of Rabbinical Midrash. The later books too of Philo’s own commentary begin in fact in the same abrupt manner. In our manuscripts and editions only the first books bear the title belonging to the whole work, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι. All the later books have special titles, a circumstance which gives the appearance of their being independent works. In truth however all that is contained in Mangey’s first vol.—viz. the works which here follow—belongs to the book in question (with the sole exception of De opificio mundi).
Emil Schürer comments:
“Περι φυγαδων. De profugis (Mangey, i. 546-577). On Gen. xvi. 6-14.—Euseb. H. E. ii. 18. 2: περι συγης και ευρεσεως. And exactly so Johannes Monachus ineditus: εκ του περι συγης και ευρεσεως (Mangey, i. 546, note). This is without doubt the correct title. For the work deals with the flight and refinding of Hagar.” (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, p. 337)
F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker write (Philo, vol. 5, pp. 3-9):
This treatise, which follows at once on the preceding, continues the exposition of Genesis xvi. from the middle of vs. 6 to vs. 12, omitting vs. 10. These verses are quoted in full in § 1, but the discussion is chiefly confined to a few words or phrases, namely “fled,” “found,” and “fountain.” The first point to be noted is that Hagar fled. Flight may be due to three different causes: hatred, fear, and shame (2-3). Hagar is an example of the third, and the story shows that the inward monitor or Elenchus, which is typified by the angel, taught her that this shame must be tempered by courage (4-6).
But we must first say something about the other two causes of flight. Hatred was the cause of Jacob’s flight from Laban. Here the two may stand from one point of view for the materialistic and the theistic creed respectively, and from another for the fool and the wise (7-13). On either interpretation the Jacob soul, finding itself unable to correct the Laban soul, will flee from association with it and repudiate it. Jacob’s wives, that is his powers, joined in this repudiation, and that part of their speech in which they say that God has taken from Laban his wealth and glory and given them to themselves lead to a short meditation on true wealth and glory (15-19). A further proof of the need of flight is drawn from Laban’s expostulation that he would have sent Jacob forth with mirth and music, which the Practiser knows to be mere enticement to return to the lower life (20-22).
For flight caused by fear we have the flight of Jacob to Laban and Haran before the wrath of Esau. Here Laban represents the brilliancy of secular life, and the lesson to be drawn is that the right way to answer the unjust, when they claim that the good things of the world fall to them, is to shew how these good things can be justly used (23-27). Let us not therefore shrink from wealth, from power, or from the banquet. Our liberality will convict the spendthrift and the miser, our just administration the tyrant, and our abstemiousness the glutton (28-32). Indeed those who affect the ascetic life are for the most part hypocrites, and to function in the outer world is the best preparation for the higher life of contemplation (33-37). The ministry to men must precede the ministry to God (38).
Again, Jacob’s flight to Haran will signify the proper attitude of the soul in the practising and progressive stage. It must fly the hard ignorance of Esau, but also it is not as yet fit to share the higher life of Isaac (39-43). And Laban to whom it is sent is after all called the brother of Rebecca or persistence, while Haran where he lives represents, as elsewhere, the world of sense, the knowledge of which is necessary to the progressing, and after some days he will be recalled thence to the higher life (44-47). Similarly Isaac bids him go to Mesopotamia, that is to the mid-torrent of life’s river, and to the house of Bethuel or daughter of God, wisdom, that is, who, though a daughter, is also a father (48-52).
Other thoughts on flight are suggested by the cities of refuge. The law states that the intentional murderer shall be put to death, but that the unintentional homicide may find refuge in an appointed place (53). Before, however, considering this latter point, he notes that the first clause of the law runs: “If a man strikes another and he dies, let him be put to death with death.” Philo, as so often, fails to understand that the last words of this are the Greek translation of the common Hebrew idiom for “surely be put to death,” and infers that “dying with death” indicates the real, the spiritual death (54-55). Other texts are quoted to shew that, as virtue is the true life, vice is the true death (56-59), though, in another sense, vice can never die, as shewn by the sign given to Cain (60-64). Another part of the same text, where it is said of the involuntary homicide that God delivered the victim to his hands, suggests that God employs subordinate ministers for the lower, though beneficial and necessary, work of punishment, and this he supports, as elsewhere, by the use of “we” in the first chapter of Genesis, and the entrustment of cursing to the less worthy and of blessing to the worthier tribes (65-74). Again, the words “I will give thee a place” may be understood to mean that God Himself is the place where the innocent can take refuge (75-76). When we read that the wilful murderer who takes refuge in a sanctuary shall be dragged from it and put to death, it means that the voluntary evil-doer, who takes refuge with God, that is, ascribes to Him the responsibility for his sins, blasphemes (77-82); and how deadly a sin blasphemy against the Divine Parent is, is shown by the very next words where the death penalty is assigned to those who speak ill of their earthly parents (83-84). The cities of refuge are only for those who truly understand the difference between the voluntary and involuntary (85-86).
As to the cities of refuge, four questions arise: (1) why they are in Levitical territory; (2) why they are six in number; (3) why three are beyond Jordan and three in Canaan; (4) why the refugee must remain till the death of the High Priest (87). The answer to the first is that the Levites themselves are fugitives from human ties, and also, as in the story of Exodus xxxii., the slayers of their kinsfolk, interpreted as the body, the unreasoning nature, and speech (88-93). To the second and the third questions the answer is that, of the six potencies of God where the guiltless may take refuge, three stand far above humanity, while three are closer to our nature (95-105). To answer the fourth point, which he thinks can hardly be understood literally without absurdity, Philo identifies the High Priest with the Logos and points out various analogies between the two. He thus explains the ordinance as meaning that, while this High Priest lives in the soul, the sins which have been banished cannot return (106-118).
The second part of the treatise (119-175) is concerned with finding, which naturally calls up the idea of seeking. We have four variants of this: not seeking and not finding, seeking and finding, not seeking and finding, seeking and not finding (119-120). The first of these is dismissed very rapidly with one or two illustrations of which Pharaoh’s obstinacy is the chief (121-125). Seeking and finding is shewn in the case of Joseph who, prompted by a “man,” that is the inward monitor, “found” his brethren in Dothan, the place of those who have abandoned delusion (126-131); of Isaac who asked “where is the victim?” and “found” that God would provide it (132-135); of the Israelites who asked about the manna, and “found” that it was the Word of God (137-139); of Moses who, when questioning his mission, “found” the answer in “I will be with you” (140-142). For seeking and not finding we have the examples of Laban seeking the images, the Sodomites seeking the door, Korah seeking the priesthood, and Pharaoh seeking Moses to kill him (143-148). Then follows a more elaborate allegorizing of the story of Judah’s intercourse with Tamar into a picture of the earnest soul wooing piety, to which he first gives as pledges the ring of trustworthiness, the chain of consistency, and the staff of discipline, and afterwards, to test her fidelity, sends the kid which represents the good things of secular life. The connexion of this story with the subject lies in the phrase “the messenger did not ‘find’ her” (149-156). Then, after a shorter spiritualizing of the incident of the goat of the sin-offering in Leviticus x. (157-160), the story of the Burning Bush is interpreted as the fruitless desire of the soul to know the causes of phenomena which are ever perishing and yet are ever renewed (161-165).
The fourth head of finding without seeking suggests many points which have been noted elsewhere; primarily, of course, the self-taught nature, Isaac, and then the delivery of the Hebrew women before the midwives come, the speed with which Jacob found the meat which God delivered into his hand, and the automatic growth on the fallow land in the Sabbatical year (166-172). This last naturally leads to some thought on the Sabbatical gift of peace (173-174), but to Philo’s mind the best example is the promise to the Israelites in Deuteronomy of cities, houses, cisterns, vineyards, oliveyards, for which they have not laboured, all of them really types of spiritual blessings (175-176).
The next phrase in the text which calls for discussion is “spring of water.” “Spring” is used as the symbol for five different things: first for the mind, which in the Creation story is described as the spring which waters the whole face of the earth, i.e. of the body (177-182); secondly it is used for education, and thus the twelve springs of Elim or “gateway” signify the Encyclia, the gateway to knowledge; and, since beside these springs there grew up seventy palm-trees, we have a short digression on the virtues of the two numbers (183-187). Thirdly there are the springs of folly, and this is illustrated by the phrase “uncovering the fount of the woman,” where the woman is sense and her husband mind, and uncovering the fount comes when the sleeping mind allows each of the senses to have free play (188-193). Fourthly there are the springs of wisdom, from which Rebecca drew (194-196); and fifthly God Himself, Who is called by Jeremiah the fountain of life. And since Jeremiah adds that the wicked dig for themselves broken cisterns which hold no water, we see the contrast with the wise who, like Abraham and Isaac, dig real wells (197-201).
The fountain by which Hagar was found was the fountain of wisdom, but hers was not yet a soul which could draw from it (202). The treatise concludes with shorter notes on a few other phrases in the passage. When the angel asked, “Whence comest thou, and whither goest thou?” it was not because he did not know the answer, since his omniscience is shewn by his knowing that the child would be a boy. The first part of the question was a rebuke for her flight, the second an indication of the uncertainty of the future (205-206). Something is added about the description given in the angel’s words of the Ishmael or sophist nature (207-211). And finally we note that Hagar acknowledges the angel as God, for to one in her lower stage of servitude God’s servants are as God Himself (211-end).