Emil Schürer writes (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, pp. 329-331):
While this shorter explanation in a catechetical form [Questions and Answers on Genesis] was intended for more extensive circles, Philo’s special and chief scientific work is his large allegorical commentary on Genesis, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι (such is the title given it in Euseb. Hist. eccl. ii. 18. 1, and Photius, Bibliotheca cod. 103. Comp. also Origen, Comment. in Matth. vol. xvii. c. 17; contra Celsum, iv. 51). These two works frequently approximate each other as to their contents. For in the Quaestiones et solutiones also, the deeper allegorical significance is given as well as the literal meaning. In the great allegorical commentary on the contrary, the allegorical interpretation exclusively prevails. The deeper allegorical sense of the sacred letter is settled in extensive and prolix discussion, which by reason of the copious adducting of parallel passages often seems to wander from the text. Thus the entire exegetic method, with its draggin in of the most heterogeneous passages in elucidation of the idea supposed to exist in the text, forcibly recalls the method of Rabbinical Midrash. This allegorical interpretation however has with all its arbitrariness, its rules and laws, the allegorical meaning as once settled for certain persons, objects and events being afterwards adhered to with tolerable consistency. Especially is it a fundamental thought, from which the exposition is everywhere deduced, that the history of mankind as related in Genesis is in reality nothing else than a system of psychology and ethic. The different individuals, who here make their appearance, denote the different states of soul (τροποι της ψυχης) which occur among men. To analyse these in their variety and their relations both to each other and to the Deity and the world of sense, and thence to deduce moral doctrines, is the special aim of this great allegorical commentary. Thus we perceive at the same time, that Philo’s chief interest is not—as might from the whole plan of his system be supposed—speculative theology for its own sake, but on the contrary psychology and ethic. To judge from his ultimate purpose he is not a speculative theologian, but a psychologist and moralist (comp. note 183).
The commentary at first follows the text of Genesis verse by verse. Afterwards single sections are selected, and some of them so fully treated, as to grow into regular monographs. Thus e.g. Philo takes occasion from the history of Noah to write two books on drunkenness (περι μεθης), which he does with such thoroughness, that a collection of the opinions of other philosophers on this subject filled the first of these lost books (Mangey, i. 357).
The work, as we have it, begins at Gen. ii. 1; Και ετελεσθησαν οι ουρανοι και η γη. The creation of the world is therefore not treated of. For the composition, De opificio mundi, which precedes it in our editions, is a work of an entirely different character, being no allegorical commentary on the history of the creation, but a statement of that history itself. Nor does the first book of the Legum allegoriae by any means join on to the work De opificio mundi; for the former begins at Gen. ii. 1, while in De opif. mundi, the creation of man also, according to Gen. ii, is already dealt with. Hence—as Gfrörer rightly asserts in answer to Dähne—the allegorical commentary cannot be combined with De opif. mundi as though the two were but parts of the same work. At most may the question be raised, whether Philo did not also write an allegorical commentary on Gen. i. This is however improbable. For the allegorical commentary proposes to treat of the history of mankind, and this does not begin till Gen. ii. 1. Nor need the abrupt commencement of Leg. alleg. i seem strange, since this manner of starting at once with the text to be expounded, quite corresponds with the method of Rabbinical Midrash. The later books too of Philo’s own commentary begin in fact in the same abrupt manner. In our manuscripts and editions only the first books bear the title belonging to the whole work, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι. All the later books have special titles, a circumstance which gives the appearance of their being independent works. In truth however all that is contained in Mangey’s first vol.—viz. the works which here follow—belongs to the book in question (with the sole exception of De opificio mundi).
Emil Schürer comments:
“Περι γιγαντων. De gigantibus (Mangey, i. 262-272). On Gen. vi. 1-4. Οτι ατρεπτον το θειον. Quod deus sit immutabilis (Mangey, i. 272-299). On Gen. vi. 4-12. These two paragraphs, which are in our editions separated, form together but one book. Hence Johannes Monachus ineditus cites passages from the latter paragraph with the formula εκ του περι γιγαντων (Mangey, i. 262, note, 272, note). Euseb. H. E. ii. 18. 4: περι γιγαντων η [elsewhere και] περι του μη τρεπεσθαι το θειον.” (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, pp. 334-335)
J. H. A. Hart writes (The Jewish Quarterly Review Original Series 17, pp. 97-103):
So the beginning of the tract headed That the Divine is unchangeable, is reached with Gen. vi. 4: “After this, when the angels of God went in unto the daughters of men, and they begat (or bare) to themselves.” That is to say, after the departure of God’s spirit the comrades of darkness unite with the passions and bare unto themselves—not to God like Abraham and Hannah, the mother of Samuel, who dedicated to God the children which he himself gave them. Such selfishness is sometimes fatal, as in the case of Aunan (Gen. xxxviii. 9).
The “wrath of God” (Gen. vi. 5-7) does not, as perhaps some will suppose, imply that the Creator repented that he had made man when he beheld their impiety. Such a theory dwarfs the crimes here recorded. For what impiety could be greater than to suppose that the Unchangeable should change? And that though some claim that not even all men waver in their opinions! For that they who practise a guileless and pure philosophy win as the greatest good out of their knowledge that they do not change with changing circumstances, but with unbending fixity and steadfast firmness set hand to all their tasks. This quiet, at which philosophy rightly so called aims, is the property of God and by him bestowed on the wise (Deut. v. 31, as before). And rightly, for God is free from all the uncertainties and changes which are responsible for change of mind or repentance, as he is lord of time and omniscient.
Happiness was first defined by Democritus as the calm and stable condition of the soul, which is untroubled by fear, superstition or any other passion, in his book, περι ευθυμιας (Diog. ix. 45: Seneca de Tranquillitate). Timon, disciple of Pyrrho the Sceptic, held the same view (Aristocles apud Eusebium, Prep. Ev. xiv. 18); and it is generally identified with that school—αταραξια being the fruit of εποχη or suspense of judgment—who inherited it from the physical philosophy of Democritus and handed it on to Epicurus. But Philo is probably thinking rather of the Stoic doctrine that what the vulgar reckon as good things are really αδιαφορα, things indifferent. For, as he judged schools of thought chiefly by the conduct of their scholars, his praise of the philosophers in question as guileless and pure, points not to Epicureans but to Stoics.
How then are we to understand God’s wrath? First notice that there are four distinct grades in the realm of Nature—stones and inanimate things, which have habit (εξις); plants and vegetables, which have nature; animals, which have soul; and men, which have rational soul. Man only has freedom—freewill—and therefore only man is blameable for his meditated misdeeds, praiseworthy for his deliberate right actions. The soul of man alone received from God freewill, and therein was made most like him; and therefore, being freed as far as possible from that harsh and grievous mistress Necessity, must be accused because it respects not him that freed it. For indeed it will most rightly pay the penalty incurred by ungrateful freedmen.
But it must not be thought that God (το ον) is really affected by anger or any passion. For wrath is characteristic of human weakness, but to God belong neither the irrational passions of the soul nor the parts and limbs of the body. None the less, such expressions are used by the great Lawgiver, in order to lesson those who cannot otherwise be chastened. For of the laws contained in the Precepts and Prohibitions which, be it known, are laws in the proper sense of the word, there are set forth two most important summary statements concerning the First Cause—one that God is not like a man (Num. xxiii. 19), and the other that God is like a man (Deut. i. 31). But the first is guaranteed by certain truth, the second is introduced with a view to the teaching of the many, for the sake of instruction or admonition, not because he is such by nature. In fact the two statements correspond to the two divisions of mankind, men of soul and men of body. To suppose that God really is like a man involves the unspeakable mythology of the impious, who profess to ascribe to God the form of man but in reality credit him with man’s passions. But Moses’ one object is to benefit all his readers, and if the men of body cannot be schooled by means of truth, let them learn the falsehoods by means of which they will be benefited. They need a terrible master to threaten them. And so to these two doctrines correspond two attitudes of God’s worshippers, fear and love. To them who conceive of the Absolute without any mortal part or passion, but honour him as he is, belongs the love of God, and the fear of God to every other.
But even so the meaning of the words “I was angry because I made them” is not settled. Perhaps it means that the wicked are made by the anger of God and the good by his grace (cf. Gen. vi. 8). And so the passion anger, rightly predicated of man, is ascribed to God metaphorically in order to the explanation of a most necessary truth, that all that we do for anger, or fear, or grief, or pleasure, or any other passion, is culpable, and any actions accompanied by right reason and knowledge praiseworthy.
Noah, then, is preserved when the rest perish. The one righteous outweighs the many impious. Thus God mingles “mercy and judgment” (Ps. c. 1), showing mercy before judgment: the cup in his hand is full of a mixture of unmixed wine (Ps. lxxiv. 9: οινου ακρατου πληρες κερασματος). The second quotation leads, as often, to a somewhat lengthy digression. Philo’s point is established by corroborative evidence from Scripture, but the evidence itself must be analysed. God’s powers represented by the cup of wine are at once mixed and unmixed; unmixed so far as he himself is concerned, mixed so far as they come into contact with his creatures. Who could bear the unmixed light of the sun? What mortal could sustain God’s knowledge and wisdom and righteousness, and each of the other virtues untempered? Nay, not even the whole heaven and world could receive them.
But what is the meaning of the text, “Noah found grace before the Lord God” (Gen. vi. 8). The word “found” may or may not imply previous possession. The ordinances relating to the great prayer (Num. vi. 2 ff.) give a clear example of the finding of something previously possessed but lost. Gen. xxvii. 20 and the promises of Deut. vi. 10 f. represent the second kind of finding, treasure-trove. In Deut. i. 43f. the Law gives the contrast to these happy finders in the persons of those who are compelled to labour against their will, doubly unhappy because they fail of their end and incur shame to boot. Each passage cited is of course fully expounded in accordance with its symbolical significance, and then Philo returns to his text. The obvious explanations are either that he obtained (ετυχεν) grace, or was reckoned worthy of grace. But both impute too high a dignity even for one who never debased the divine coinage within him, the most sacred mind, by evil practices. And so it might be better perhaps to adopt the view that the good man (ο αστειος), having by seeking gained much knowledge, found this great truth that all things, earth, water, air, fire, sun, stars, heaven, all animals and plants are the grace of God. For he pleased not the Absolute, like Moses (Ex. xxxiii. 17), but his ruling and beneficent Powers, “Lord” and “God.”
To complete the exposition, Philo recalls the story of Joseph. It is said that he “found grace” (Gen. xxxix. 20f.), but with the gaoler, not with God; and at the touch of the wand of allegory this patriarch is transformed into the mind that loved the body and its passions, sold to the chief cook, banned from the holy assembly by the Law (Deut. xxiii. 1), and finally cast into the prison of the passions. The story of his life as a whole is given elsewhere, but this episode, taken by itself, is now used as an awful warning to the reader. Reject such pleasing, O soul: aim with all zeal at pleasing the First Cause. Or if thou canst not that, become suppliant to his Powers that thou may be ranked with the generations of “Noah, a righteous man, perfect in his generation, who blessed God” (Gen. vi. 9).
One might fittingly inquire why it is said immediately after this that the earth was corrupted before God, and was filled with iniquity (Gen. vi. 11). But perhaps it is not hard to attain a solution if one is not too devoid of culture. Whenever the incorruptible rises up in the soul the mortal immediately is corrupted, for the generation of the good is the death of the evil practices, since when light shines the darkness vanishes. All which is set forth in the law of leprosy (Lev. xiii). For there it is said, contrary to the general opinion of mankind, that that which is healthy and living is the source of corruption of that which is diseased and dead: partial leprosy standing for voluntary, complete leprosy for involuntary sin. The priest convicts us of our sin, bids us purge ourselves that he may see the house of the soul clean, and if there be any diseases therein may heal them. It was so with the widow who encountered the prophet (3 Kings xvii. 10 ff.), for she is not widow in the ordinary literal sense, but one whose mind is widowed of the passions that hurt the mind, like Thamar (Gen. xxxviii. 11).
In Gen. vi. 12 “all flesh” is of course feminine in the Greek, but the pronoun “his way” is masculine. Some may think that there is a mistake here, and correct the inflexion (πτωσις). But perhaps the way is not that of the flesh alone but also that of the Eternal and Incorruptible, the perfect way that leads to God, the goal whereof is knowledge and understanding of God. This path every companion of flesh hates, rejects and attempts to corrupt; and the earthly, for such is the interpretation of Edom, bar this royal road to the seers, that is Israel. The way, as was said before, is wisdom, through which alone suppliant souls may fly for refuge to the Uncreated. They that go thereby realize his blessedness and their own worthlessness, like Abraham (Gen. xviii. 27); for they take the mean between all extremes, good disciples of Aristotle, and so draw near to God. And as we pass through the enemies’ country we will not touch their water, else must we give them honour (for τιμη here is ” honour” not “price”). For when the wicked see any of the more austere yielding to the allurements of pleasure, they rejoice and count themselves honoured, and begin to philosophize about their own evils as necessary and profitable. Say then to all such that human affairs have no real subsistence, they are but lying dreams. Consider the history of any one man and the history of the world. Hellas flourished once, but Macedonians robbed it of strength; Macedonia flourished and fell—so was it with Persian and Parthian, with Egypt, Carthage, and Pontus; so throughout the world the divine Logos, which men call Chance, orders the shifting fates of nations, exalting one and abasing another, that the whole world like one city may keep that best of all forms of government, Democracy. Let us have done then with mortal things and strive to have our inward judge—our conscience—favourable, as we may if we never seek to reverse any of his decisions.
F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker write (Philo, vol. 3, p. 3):
This treatise, which is really a continuation of the De Gigantibus, discusses the following verses, Gen. vi. 4-12.
I. (1-19) And after this when the angels of God went in unto the daughters of men, and begat for themselves . . . (v. 4).
II. (20-73) But the Lord God seeing that the wickednesses of men were multiplied upon the earth and that every man is purposing in his heart carefully evil things every day, God had it in His mind that He had made man upon the earth and He bethought Him. And God said, I will blot out man whom I have made from the face of the earth . . . because I was wroth that I had made him (vv. 5-7).
III. (74-121) But Noah found grace before God. Now these are the generations of Noah. Noah was a just man, being perfect in his generation, and Noah was well pleasing to God (vv. 8-9).
IV. (122-139) And the earth was “corrupted” (or destroyed) before God, and the earth was filled with iniquity (v. 11).
V. (140-end) And the Lord God saw the earth, and it was corrupted, because all flesh destroyed His way upon the earth (v. 12).
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