Allegorical Interpretation, II

Emil Schürer writes (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, pp. 329-331):
While this shorter explanation in a catechetical form [Questions and Answers on Genesis] was intended for more extensive circles, Philo’s special and chief scientific work is his large allegorical commentary on Genesis, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι (such is the title given it in Euseb. Hist. eccl. ii. 18. 1, and Photius, Bibliotheca cod. 103. Comp. also Origen, Comment. in Matth. vol. xvii. c. 17; contra Celsum, iv. 51). These two works frequently approximate each other as to their contents. For in the Quaestiones et solutiones also, the deeper allegorical significance is given as well as the literal meaning. In the great allegorical commentary on the contrary, the allegorical interpretation exclusively prevails. The deeper allegorical sense of the sacred letter is settled in extensive and prolix discussion, which by reason of the copious adducting of parallel passages often seems to wander from the text. Thus the entire exegetic method, with its draggin in of the most heterogeneous passages in elucidation of the idea supposed to exist in the text, forcibly recalls the method of Rabbinical Midrash. This allegorical interpretation however has with all its arbitrariness, its rules and laws, the allegorical meaning as once settled for certain persons, objects and events being afterwards adhered to with tolerable consistency. Especially is it a fundamental thought, from which the exposition is everywhere deduced, that the history of mankind as related in Genesis is in reality nothing else than a system of psychology and ethic. The different individuals, who here make their appearance, denote the different states of soul (τροποι της ψυχης) which occur among men. To analyse these in their variety and their relations both to each other and to the Deity and the world of sense, and thence to deduce moral doctrines, is the special aim of this great allegorical commentary. Thus we perceive at the same time, that Philo’s chief interest is not—as might from the whole plan of his system be supposed—speculative theology for its own sake, but on the contrary psychology and ethic. To judge from his ultimate purpose he is not a speculative theologian, but a psychologist and moralist (comp. note 183).

The commentary at first follows the text of Genesis verse by verse. Afterwards single sections are selected, and some of them so fully treated, as to grow into regular monographs. Thus e.g. Philo takes occasion from the history of Noah to write two books on drunkenness (περι μεθης), which he does with such thoroughness, that a collection of the opinions of other philosophers on this subject filled the first of these lost books (Mangey, i. 357).
The work, as we have it, begins at Gen. ii. 1; Και ετελεσθησαν οι ουρανοι και η γη. The creation of the world is therefore not treated of. For the composition, De opificio mundi, which precedes it in our editions, is a work of an entirely different character, being no allegorical commentary on the history of the creation, but a statement of that history itself. Nor does the first book of the Legum allegoriae by any means join on to the work De opificio mundi; for the former begins at Gen. ii. 1, while in De opif. mundi, the creation of man also, according to Gen. ii, is already dealt with. Hence—as Gfrörer rightly asserts in answer to Dähne—the allegorical commentary cannot be combined with De opif. mundi as though the two were but parts of the same work. At most may the question be raised, whether Philo did not also write an allegorical commentary on Gen. i. This is however improbable. For the allegorical commentary proposes to treat of the history of mankind, and this does not begin till Gen. ii. 1. Nor need the abrupt commencement of Leg. alleg. i seem strange, since this manner of starting at once with the text to be expounded, quite corresponds with the method of Rabbinical Midrash. The later books too of Philo’s own commentary begin in fact in the same abrupt manner. In our manuscripts and editions only the first books bear the title belonging to the whole work, Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι. All the later books have special titles, a circumstance which gives the appearance of their being independent works. In truth however all that is contained in Mangey’s first vol.—viz. the works which here follow—belongs to the book in question (with the sole exception of De opificio mundi).
Emil Schürer comments:
“Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι πρωται των μετα την εξαημερον. Legum allegoriarum liber i. (Mangey, i. 43-65). On Gen. ii. 1-17.—Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι δευτεραι των μετα την εξαημερον. Legum allegoriarum liber ii. (Mangey, i. 66-86). On Gen. ii. 18-iii. 1a.—Νομων ιερων αλληγοριαι τριται των μετα την εξαημερον. Legum allegoriarum liber iii. (Mangey, i. 87-137). On Gen. iii. 8b-19.—The titles here given of the first three books, as customary in the editions since Mangey, require an important correction. Even the different extent of Books i. and ii. leads us to conjecture, that they may properly be but one book. In fact Mangey remarks at the commencement of the third book (i. 87, note): in omnibus codicibus opusculum hoc inscribitur αλληγορια δευτερα. Thus we have in fact but two books. There is however a gap between the two, the commentary on Gen. iii. 1b-8a being absent. The commentary too on Gen. iii. 20-23 is wanting, for the following book begins with Gen. iii. 24. As Philo in these first books follows the text step by step, it must be assumed, that each of the two pieces was worked up into a book by itself, and this is even certain with respect to the second. Hence the original condition was very probably as follows: Book i. on Gen. ii. 1-3, 1a, Book ii. on Gen. iii. 1b-3, 8a, Book iii. on Gen. iii. 8b-19, Book iv. on Gen. iii. 20-23. With this coincides the fact, that in the so-called Johannes Monachus ineditus, the commentary on Gen. iii. 8b-19 is indeed more often quoted as το γ της των νομων ιερων αλληγοριας (Mangey, i. 87, note). When on the other hand the same book is entitled as showing that the actual second book was already missing in the archetype of these manuscripts.” (The Literature of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, pp. 331-332)
F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker write (Philo, vol. 1, pp. 220-223):
This treatise deals with Genesis ii. 18-iii. 1. Let us mark its mode of dealing with the Sacred Text in salient instances.

The story of the creation of Eve, we are told, is not meant to be taken literally. It is a “Myth,” showing forth the origin of Sense-perception, which becomes active when Mind is asleep (Gen. ii. 21). The bringing of Woman to Man is the introduction of Sense-perception to Mind, which hails it as its own (ii. 22 f.). (19 ff., 40 ff.)

That Adam and Eve were both naked (ii. 25) means that they were without either good or evil; for nakedness of soul can show itself as (a) freedom from passions; (b) loss of virtue; (c) neutrality. Adam and Eve were inactive both in mind and sense-perception, and were “unashamed,” i.e. without either the shamelessness of the worthless man, or the shamefastness of the man of worth. (53 ff.)

The entry of the Serpent (Gen. iii. 1) is due to the need of some means of uniting Mind and Sense-perception for their joint apprehension of objects, and of eliciting their activities. (71 ff.)

Let us notice next the extent to which Philo dwells on single words.

The word “alone” in Gen. ii. 18 draws out the reminder that God only is alone, self-contained, needing naught, not composite; while the heavenly Man ever yearns to be with God, and the earthy man always is with his passions. (1-4.)

The word “help” or “helper” suggests to him the created, later-born helpers given to the earthy man. These “wild beasts” are the senses and passions, such as desire, fear, anger, given to Mind (Gen. ii. 19)𤤖ur helpers, but often our foes. (5 ff.)

The word “moreover” (in the Greek version of Gen. ii. 19) is taken by Philo to mean a second creation of senses and passions; and this further creation is accounted for by the observation that evils are numerous, and by the suggestion that Gen. i. 24 refers to genera, and Gen. ii. 19 to species, a suggestion in support of which evidence is adduced. (11 f.)

In the account of the giving of names to the creatures, the words “what he would call” are taken as meaning “why he would invite.” (14 f.)
In the story of the creation of Eve, “ribs” or “sides” are understood as “strength”; “took” as meaning “entered on the roll,” “registered,” i.e. brought into active service (this on the strength of Numb. xxxi. 26, “take the sum”); “filled up flesh in its stead” means “fulfilled” sense-perception, and “filled” the body “with it”; and woman is “builded” (Gen. ii. 22, R.V. margin) because she is moved to activity from without. (19 f., 35, 38 f.)

A striking example of single words pressed into the service of allegory is Adam’s welcome to Eve, “This is now bone of my bones.” “This” is Sense-perception no longer passive but become active; and “now” is indicative of Sense-perception being affected only by the present. (42 f.)

We pass on to observe the examples afforded by this treatise of Philo’s fondness for drawing illustrations and adducing parallels from the story of the patriarchs and the early history of Israel.

In 46 f. Philo maintains that, though active Sense-perception, being an extension of the potential Sense-perception inherent in Mind, may be said to come from Mind, yet to suppose that anything whatever is, in the strict sense of the word, derived from Mind is to be guilty of shallow thinking, and illustrates the truth of what he says by the contrast between Rachel addressing to Jacob the appeal “Give me children,” and “the Lord opening Leah’s womb” (Gen. xxix. 31 and xxx. 1 f.).

In 51 f. the danger of the drawing down of Mind from the love of God by its cleaving to Sense-perception is brought out by a reference to Levi’s noble choice (Deut. xxxiii. 9) making the Lord his portion (x. 9), and to the two goats of Lev. xvi. 8.

Freedom from passions (one of the meanings of “nakedness”) is illustrated by Moses setting up the Tent of Witness outside the Camp (Exod. xxxiii. 7); by Aaron entering unrobed (!) into the Holy of Holies (cf. Lev. xvi. 1 ff.); by Nadab and Abihu leaving their coats (or irrational parts) for Mishael and Elzaphan (Lev. x. 5); by Abraham leaving his country (Gen. xii. 1); by Isaac being forbidden to go down into Egypt (i.e. the body, Gen. xxvi. 2); and by Jacob’s smoothness (Gen. xxvii. 11). (54 ff.)

Loss of virtue (another meaning given to “nakedness”) is illustrated by Noah’s lapse (Gen. ix. 21). And the indications which Philo finds in the narrative that the lapse was not irretrievable are illustrated by the provision in the Law that vows made only in intent may be rescinded (Numb. xxx. 10). (60 ff.)

The assaults of pleasure and the healing virtue of Self-mastery are illustrated by the deadly serpents and the brazen serpent of the wilderness journey (Numb. xxi.). Distraction, Pleasure’s agent, is like the scorpion (=”scattering”) of the desert. The soul-thirst of “Egypt” is quenched by the Wisdom (“Water”) as is hunger by the Word (“Manna”) of God. A sign of the great daring of Pleasure, in attacking even Moses, is found in the story of his rod. Like Jacob’s, it is “discipline.” Shrinking from this, Moses casts it away, and is then bidden to grasp it by its tail (Exod. iv. 1 ff.). (78 ff., 87 ff.)

Pleasure is again pointed at in the Prayer of Jacob (Gen. xlix. 16-18), where Dan (=”distinguishing”) is the principle of self-mastery, who is to become a serpent biting the horse (sc. passions), and saving from them Mind (the “horseman”), who “waits for” God’s “salvation”; and in the Song of Moses (Exod. xv. 1), where horse and rider, i.e. the four passions with Mind mounted on them, are cast into the sea.


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