Article

While the issue appears in several studies and monographs on Alexander’s policies in Asia. Various aspects of the Iranians’ presence in Alexander’s army have been analyzed in Berve 1926 I, 103–217; Brunt 1963, 27–46; Griffith 1963, 68–74; Badian 1965, 160–1; Bosworth 1980, 1–21; Hammond 1983; 1996; 1998; Olbrycht 2004; 77–204; 2010, 364–365. There has never been a comprehensive study that seeks to analyze not only the numbers but also the place accorded to Iranian troops in Alexander’s army as well as the influence that they exerted in both the military and the empire (Bosworth 1980; 1–21; Hamilton 1987, Briant 1980, 37–83 (= Rois, tributs et paysans, Paris 1982, 357–403); Olbrycht 2004; 2010; Lane Fox 2007, 267–311; Müller 2011). The ancient authors of Alexander paid little attention to these Oriental troops, providing only scant and fragmentary information on them, preferring instead to ignore them. This tendency in the sources was rightly pointed out by E. Badian: ‘We know very little about Alexander’s actual use of Iranians, except for a few eminent personages (such as satraps) and, in a very general sense, auxiliary units. Our sources were not interested, and even their sources had not been, except where serious trouble resulted’ (Badian 1985, 482. Similarly Berve 1926, I, 152).

The death of Darius III in western Parthia (summer 330) concluded an important stage in Alexander’s Asian expedition. For many Macedonians, this event meant the end of the war: the king of the Persian empire had been defeated and murdered by his own officials. Although the eastern part of that great empire remained unconquered, most Macedonians wished to return home. They had achieved more than they had dreamt before the war began in 334. For their part, many Iranian officials and commanders, who had remained loyal to Darius to the end, saw no point in offering further resistance and surrendered to Alexander. The commanders, who were still at the head of a powerful army, controlled the Achaemenid heartland and royal residences – Persepolis, Susa, Babylon, and Ekbatana. Yet when Alexander crossed the Caspian Gates in 330, he did so without any effective resistance against his army in western Iran. On the subjugation of Babylonia and Western Iran, see Seibert 1985, 96–114 and Bosworth 1988, 85–97. The Macedonian king thus decided to continue the war and press on into eastern Iran and Central Asia (Olbrycht 1996, 151–153). He found it difficult, however, to persuade his Macedonian soldiers to keep fighting. Nor was that the only serious challenge he faced. Of crucial importance was his need to maintain the army’s combat readiness in tact. For that purpose, it was necessary to ensure appropriate logistical support and especially to reinforce the ranks with new soldiers.

During the war in Persia, Alexander’s army was continually reinforced by recruits from the Balkans. In the spring of 333, Alexander received 300 cavalry and 3,000 infantry from Macedon as well as some troops from Thessaly and Elis (Arr. 1.29.4). Further reinforcements joined Alexander in the summer and autumn of 333.7 In Sittakene (Diod. 17.65.1; Curt. 5.1.39–42; Arr. 3.16.10) in 331 Alexander was met with fresh recruits from officers whom he had sent to collect them in Macedon (Diod. 17.49.1; Curt. 4.6.30) the year before. After 331, the king’s army received no further reinforcements from Macedon. Apparently, the country had been stripped of recruits. The effect of Alexander’s expedition on Macedonian demographics is variously estimated. The negative impact of Alexander’s expedition on Macedonian demographics is most convincingly demonstrated by Seibert 1986, 835–851. For other assessments, see Adams 1984; Bosworth 1986; 2002, 64–97; Badian 1994. There is general agreement that it aggravated the country’s male population. This is made clear especially by Diodoros (18.12.2) who writes about the shortage of men in Macedon at the outset of the Lamian War (322) as a result of so many recruits who had been sent to Alexander. Badian 1994, 267 rejects Diodoros’ statement with a dubious argument: ‘This passage is indeed interesting, for it suggests that the theory held by Seibert and adopted by Bosworth, that Alexander exhausted Macedonian manpower, may even be ancient, and in fact date back to the Hellenistic age.’ There is no need to consider Diodoros’ sober remark as some false theory. Badian is ignoring the fact that out of Alexander’s army in Asia only a few returned home before 323 and that the soldiers, the flower of the male population, were in a prolonged separation from their lawful wives, who remained in Macedon. Alexander himself was well aware of the demographic difficulties in his homeland.

1. In 334 he dispatched Macedonian newlyweds home from Anatolia to winter and return to service in the following spring. He also ordered officers ‘to enlist as many cavalry and infantry from the land as possible’ (Arr. 1.24.1). When he released a small group of Macedonians in Baktria in 329, Alexander demanded that they attend to begetting progeny (ut liberos generarent – Curt. 7.5.27). That no further Macedonian reinforcements were sent was in part due to the less than stable situation in Hellas after 331. While Antipater could count on receiving a number of Macedonian recruits in Europe, he needed them urgently for action in Greece: Agis III of Sparta had initiated a war against Macedon (331) (Badian 1994; Blackwell 1999, 53–79). Unrest kept breaking out in various regions throughout the Balkans. Zopyrion, Alexander’s general in Thrace, was completely routed by the Scythians and perished with his army of 30,000 men (ca. 330 or 326) (Iust. 2.3.4, 12.1.4, 12.2.16–17; Curt. 10.1.44–45. Cf. Bosworth 1988, 166; Seibert 1985, 184; Dempsie 1991, 78).
2. Alexander was compelled to seek elsewhere for reinforcements. Thus he hired mercenaries, mainly Greek, but also Balkan (especially Thracian). Additionally, men were called up from various western Asian satrapies, such as Syria, Karia and Lydia (Hammond 1996, 99–109). Yet such measures fell short of solving the central problem of maintaining the royal army’s numerical force and combat strength. Greek mercenaries (with few exceptions) did not constitute its key formations; they were mostly used as garrison personnel in the satrapies and as settlers in colonies. The same was generally true of Anatolians and Thracians. As a result, Alexander was compelled to tap into local populations where he concentrated his military and political activity from 330 onward – on the Iranian Plateau and in Central Asia. There was one more important reason for Alexander to recruit Iranians: they were a major military potential in lands east of the Tigris and could pose a threat to Alexander, as was forcefully demonstrated in Areia, Sogdiana, and Baktria. To forestall any potential revolt, Alexander drew upon the lessons learned from his Thracian campaign (Bosworth 1988, 28–30). In the Iranian satrapies, Alexander repeatedly insisted that hostages be given him. From Oxyartes, Rhoxana’s father, he demanded two of his sons for military service, but the noble gave up all three (Curt. 8.4.21).

1. Among the reasons why the Iranian phalanx troops called the Successors (epigonoi) were activated in 327 was the need to enlist fresh recruits and the growing fear of unrest in the Iranian hinterland as the Indian campaign progressed (Curt. 8.5.4). In India and on other occasions Alexander took hostages. Hostages in India: Arr. 6.14.3. Polydamas, sent to Ekbatana to secure Parmenion’s execution, was given two Arabs as companions, their wives and children remaining with Alexander as hostages to guarantee their loyalty (Curt. 7.2.18). Typically, they were young men who were conscripted. For Alexander, this arrangement had multiple advantages. No only did he obtain new soldiers, but he secured the loyalty of their fathers and relatives, while simultaneously despoiling the satrapies of men fit to bear arms.
2. Thus Alexander, claiming the kingdom of Asia, presented himself to the Orientals as their rightful king and tried to win them over for military service. The authenticity of this letter has been questioned, but there is no reason to reject its substance; i.e., the intentions of Alexander’s policies. On the authenticity of the letter and its substance, see Griffith 1963, 69, n. 4; 1968, 33–48; Pearson 1954–55, 447–450. The Macedonian was only too happy to recruit Iranians and other subjects of Darius III. Yet at that stage in the war we know of few instances of Achaemenid officials and Iranian soldiers deserting Darius to join Alexander. The only senior Achaemenid officer then in Alexander’s immediate circle was Mithrines, who had surrendered the Sardes citadel in 333 (Arr. 1.17.3f.; Curt. 3.12.6). It seems that the claim of numerous Persian deserters was inserted in the letter by an author drawing from the accounts concerning the events after the battle of Gaugamela (331) when numerous Iranians arrived in Alexander’s camp in the summer of 330 when he rested in Parthia and Hyrkania.

The first Iranian units of significant size in Alexander’s army, including Baktrians and Sogdians, are explicitly reported in Central Asia in 328 (Arr. 4.17.3). This raises the question of whether Alexander had not previously made use of the highly skillful Median or Parthian horsemen. Most scholars reject the possibility. But G.T. Griffith (1963, 69) posed just such a scenario: ‘If Bactrians and Sogdians could be enlisted by 328, when those two satrapies were still very far from ‘pacified’, it is hard indeed to believe that the satrapies by now long securely held, such as Persis, Media and the rest, had not been called on for levies before this.’ G.T. Griffith posited the notion as the natural result of ‘general probability.’ He rightly remarked that ‘with much of the fine cavalry of the former Persian armies available now, it would seem surprising indeed if Alexander did not make use of it, always supposing that it was politically sound to do so.’ From that year onward, the steady increase of Iranians in Alexander’s army was the direct consequence of his new pro-Iranian policy which he had begun in the satrapy of Parthia-Hyrkania in eastern Iran (Olbrycht 2010).